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ABSTRACT
Corporate insiders can avoid losses if they dispose of their stock
while in possession of material nonpublic information. One means of
disposal, selling the stock, is illegal and subject to prompt mandatory
reporting. A second strategy is almost as effective, yet it faces lax
reporting requirements and enforcement. That second method is to
donate the stock to a charity and take a charitable tax deduction at the
inflated stock price. This “insider giving” is a potent substitute for
insider trading. We show that insider giving is far more widespread
than previously believed. In particular, we show that insider giving is
not limited to officers and directors. Large investors appear to regularly
receive material nonpublic information and use it to avoid losses. Using
a vast dataset of essentially all transactions in public company common
stock since 1986, we find consistent and economically significant
evidence that these shareholders’ impeccable timing likely reflects
information leakage. We also document substantial evidence of
backdating—investors falsifying the date of their gift to capture a larger
tax break. We show why lax reporting and enforcement encourage
insider giving, explain why insider giving represents a policy failure,
and highlight the theoretical implications of these findings to broader
corporate, securities, and tax debates.
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INTRODUCTION
When corporate insiders learn about bad news at their company,
they can avoid losses by selling their stock before the public finds out.
This form of “insider trading” is illegal and risky. But selling stock is
not the only way to cash out. A second strategy is almost as effective
and faces lax reporting requirements and enforcement. That second
method is to donate the stock to a charity and take a tax deduction at
the inflated stock price.
To understand the power of gifts, consider a recent gift by Kodak
director George Karfunkel. On July 29, 2020, news that Kodak might
land a lucrative government contract to manufacture COVID-19
vaccines sent its stock soaring to $60 per share.1 Before the news,
Kodak was worth only two dollars per share.2 Only a few days later,
when the public learned that the deal was off, Kodak dropped to six
dollars per share.3 In the narrow window in between, Karfunkel made

1. Eastman Kodak Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 99.3 (Sept. 15, 2020)
[hereinafter Report to the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of Eastman Kodak
Company], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000031235/000156459020043659/kodkex993_7.htm [https://perma.cc/83KW-HA7B].
2. Eastman Kodak Company (KODK), YAHOO FINANCE!, https://finance.yahoo.com/
quote/KODK/history?p=KODK [https://perma.cc/PX4C-NPHV].
3. Rachael Levy, Geoffrey Rogow & Alex Leary, Kodak’s $765 Million Moment: How It
Happened and How It Went Wrong, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2020, 11:06 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/what-drove-kodaks-roller-coaster-trump-deal-one-determined-white-house-official11597935982 [https://perma.cc/TE9Q-6MC5].
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a donation of 3 million shares nominally worth $112 million.4 The
impeccable timing of his philanthropy let him grab honorifics like “the
single largest gift recorded to a religious group.”5 It also converted the
gift into a money maker, conferring probable tax benefits worth more
than $70 million on Karfunkel—nearly four times the proceeds of a
legal sale of his shares.6 He cashed out at the peak of the wildly
swinging stock price, and he nearly avoided regulatory attention.7
Karfunkel’s gift bore important hallmarks of potential
manipulation. As a director, Karfunkel likely knew that the
government deal propping up the stock price was unlikely to
materialize, and he might have used that information to time his gift.
Further, it was later reported that Karfunkel retroactively rescinded 1
million shares of his gift,8 adding to the oddity of the transaction. In
such circumstances, suspicions may be raised regarding whether the

4. Curt Devine, Kodak Insider’s Stock Donation Raises New Concerns Around the
Company’s Government Loan, CNN (Aug. 11, 2020, 10:04 PM) [perma.cc/7X2W-ANU3]; see Al
Root, Kodak Stock’s Rally Destroys Short Sellers. They’re Down $50 Million, BARRON’S (July 29,
2020, 7:32 PM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/kodak-stocks-rally-destroys-short-sellerstheyre-down-50-million-51596056297 [https://perma.cc/8UZW-Q3KF]. Over 550 million shares
changed hands on July 28 and 29. Root, supra.
5. Theo Francis, Mark Maremont & Geoffrey Rogow, Kodak Insider Makes Well-Timed
Stock Gift of $116 Million to Religious Charity He Started, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2020, 4:51 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/kodak-insider-makes-well-timed-stock-gift-of-116-million-toreligious-charity-he-started-11597154826 [https://perma.cc/99GW-JSU2].
6. Assuming the Kodak shareholder was at a 45 percent combined federal and state tax
rate, writing off a $112 million donation brings a tax benefit of about $50.4 million. The gift would
also eliminate the need to pay capital gains. If the stock was purchased at two dollars per share,
the gains would be $106 million, and thus the capital gains tax avoided would be worth $21.2
million. His 3 million shares would have been worth $6 million before the rumors of a government
contract and $18 million after—a fraction of the tax benefit.
7. Ironically, this suspicious donation contributed to concerns about unfair business
practices at Kodak and jeopardized a large government loan to Kodak. In return, these troubling
developments contributed to a precipitous drop in Kodak stock price, thereby severely hurting
Kodak shareholders. Adam Shaw, SEC Investigating Kodak Announcement of $765 Million
Government Loan: Report, FOX BUS. (Aug. 4, 2020), https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/secinvestigating-kodak-announcement-of-765-government-loan-report [https://perma.cc/U5A4Y5SX].
8. See Mark Maremont, Kodak Director Makes Retroactive Cut to Huge Charity Stock Gift,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2021, 3:53 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/kodak-director-makesretroactive-cut-to-huge-charity-stock-gift-11610571219 [https://perma.cc/2UUK-ZVHL] (explaining
Karfunkel’s strange decision to rescind 1 million shares, without making the required filing for so
doing).
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reported date of the gift is accurate, or whether it may have been
backdated to capture the higher predrop value.9
Whatever the truth about Kodak, it is tempting to ignore
manipulative gifting as uncommon, unimportant, and uninteresting:
uncommon, because such gifts may appear to be aberrational; how
often is a person simultaneously philanthropic and Machiavellian?
Unimportant, because manipulative gifts are still gifts, and thus,
harmless; tax, corporate, and securities law have much bigger fish to
fry. Uninteresting, because everybody knows that directors sometimes
abuse their power and insight.10 To the contrary, this Article
demonstrates that manipulative gifts are worryingly widespread, toxic
in the same ways as familiar forms of fraud and insider trading, and of
great theoretical importance.
Previous research indicates that corporate executives and
directors use inside information as well as several manipulative
techniques both to trade11 and to maximize the value of their gifts,

9. Kodak commissioned an internal investigation to determine whether Karfunkel’s gifts
constituted wrongdoing. Report to the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of Eastman
Kodak Company, supra note 1, at 5. Unfortunately, the investigation was hamstrung in ways that
limit its utility:
Finally, it is important to note that Akin Gump’s ability to fully investigate the bona
fides of the gift or the charity that received it was limited because we did not have access
to the records of the charity and were unable to interview any of its officers or directors
with the exception of Karfunkel. Akin Gump’s review and the Special Committee’s
recommendations also do not address the potential tax implications of the gift to
Karfunkel or any other party.
Id. at 67.
10. Interestingly, Karfunkel is not alone in the domain of photography-company fiduciaries
allegedly involving charities in insider trading. Plaintiffs won a jury verdict arguing, inter alia, that
Polaroid’s founder had caused a charitable foundation to sell large amounts of Polaroid stock
while adverse information about the stock remained nonpublic (though the verdict was later
overturned on other grounds). Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
11. For insider trading studies, see generally H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’ Profits, Costs of
Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. ECON. 189, 210 (1986) (concluding that insiders can
predict abnormal future stock price changes); Arturo Bris, Do Insider Trading Laws Work?, 11
EUR. FIN. MGMT. 267, 306–09 (2003) (examining insider trading laws and their enforcement); H.
Nejat Seyhun, The Information Content of Aggregate Insider Trading, 61 J. BUS. 1, 1–22 (1988)
(investigating the information content of aggregate insider trading); H. Nejat Seyhun, Why Does
Aggregate Insider Trading Predict Future Stock Returns?, 107 Q.J. ECON. 1303, 1329 (1992)
(documenting “a strong relation between past aggregate insider trading and future excess stock
returns”); H. NEJAT SEYHUN, INVESTMENT INTELLIGENCE FROM INSIDER TRADING (1998)
(explaining that insider trading signals provide valuable investment advice); Bin Ke, Steven
Huddart & Kathy Petroni, What Insiders Know About Future Earnings and How They Use It:
Evidence from Insider Trades, 35 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315, 315 (2003) (documenting insider trading
on “knowledge of specific and economically significant forthcoming accounting disclosures as
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often just prior to a decline in the company’s share price.12 That
research uncovered a floor, not a ceiling, on the amount of
manipulative giving, because it was focused exclusively on executives
and directors. No previous research investigates whether large
shareholders are able to utilize insider information when making a
donation of the stock of their company. Yet if executives can use
corporate information to inflate the value of their gifts, then they can
share such with large shareholders whose favor executives may seek.
Moreover, some manipulative giving is accomplished through
backdating gifts. After a stock price drops, the donor softens the blow
by falsely recording a gift made at the earlier time, claiming a deduction
based on the earlier (higher) price. Any large investor with an eraser
can give backdating a try yet, until now, no one had any guess as to
whether shareholders were in on the game.
This Article investigates manipulative gifts by utilizing a
comprehensive database that includes all gifts of common stock by
large shareholders in all publicly listed firms in the United States. Our
data cover all reported gifts of common stock and contain over 9,000
observations between 1986 and 2020.13 The total volume of gifts
contained in our dataset is approximately 2.1 billion shares, with a
dollar value of approximately $50 billion. Consequently, our findings
apply generally to all large shareholders’ gifts of their firm’s stock.
We find that large shareholders’ gifts are suspiciously well-timed.
Stock prices rise abnormally about 6 percent during the one-year
period before the gift date, and they fall abnormally by about 4 percent
during the one-year period after the gift date, meaning that large
shareholders tend to find the perfect day on which to give.
long as 2 years prior to the disclosure”); John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, Scott A. Richardson &
Rodrigo S. Verdi, Stock Market Anomalies: What Can We Learn from Repurchases and Insider
Trading?, 11 REV. ACCT. STUD. 49, 68 (2006) (concluding that “managers’ repurchase and insider
trading behavior varies consistently with the information underlying the operating accruals
trading strategy”).
12. See David Yermack, Deductio’ Ad Absurdum: CEOs Donating Their Own Stock to
Their Own Family Foundations, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 107, 107–08 (2009) (discussing and studying large
gifts of stock by Chairmen and CEOs of public companies to their own private family
foundations); see also S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Manipulative Games
of Gifts by Corporate Executives, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1131, 1170 (2016) (observing that sometimes
executives will donate stocks just prior to a negative announcement that they know will drop stock
prices).
13. We exclude preferred stock from our study because its value is less sensitive to
information. Yet some manipulative giving may involve preferred stock, so our results may
understate the extent of manipulative giving.
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These results are almost certainly not the result of luck. To the
contrary, our research lets us identify information leakage as the most
important cause of these results: executives seem to provide material
nonpublic information to large shareholders, who then use it to time
gifts. A second explanation is also supported, though its magnitude is
smaller: backdating. The telltale sign of backdating is that the givers’
extraordinary luck tends to grow alongside the delay they take in
reporting the gift. A donor who waits a few weeks to report a gift can
cherry-pick the best date to retroactively claim their gift was
consummated. That is precisely what we find.14
The evidence is consistent with insider giving being quite common:
there are enough suspicious gifts for every public company to be
subject to it every year.15 It is also large in magnitude. This Article
focuses on the large shareholder. When the gifts of officers and
directors are added to the sample, we see over $300 billion of gifts and
suspicious outperformance, suggesting the possibility of approximately
$10 billion in excess tax deductions annually.16
The widespread occurrence of manipulative gifts is surely a result
of a lax regulatory environment. It is commonly believed that “there’s
no law against insider giving.”17 That belief is erroneous. Numerous
state and federal laws constrain manipulative gifts.18 However, there is
no doubt that the law of insider giving is less clear and developed than
the law of insider trading. Gifts also enjoy an attractive degree of
opacity—whereas insider sales must be reported within two days,
insider gifts can be reported more than 400 days after the fact.19 Finally,
the tax code that awards deductions for gifts appears to be entirely
naive to the possibility of manipulative giving; from a tax perspective,
manipulative givers have nothing to fear.20

14. Infra Part III.D.
15. This Article addresses almost 10,000 shareholder gifts, across more than 1,600 firms over
34 years—a rate of about 14 percent per firm-year. Infra Part III.B. Previous research on
executive gifts identified more than 200,000 gifts across almost 10,000 firms over 29 years, Avci et
al., supra note 12, at 1152, suggesting a rate of about 79 percent per firm-year. Together,
shareholder and executive gifts exceed one per year.
16. This figure combines both large shareholders at the heart of this study, as well as officers
and directors.
17. Francis et al., supra note 5.
18. Infra Part III.
19. Infra notes 185–87 and accompanying text.
20. Infra Part I.B.
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But is it so bad? The Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) has long believed that an insider’s gifts “present less
likelihood for opportunities for abuse.”21 And it may seem intuitive
that manipulative gifts are ultimately harmless—the recipient charity
is still better off than it started. Yet manipulative gifts undermine the
policy goals of several different bodies of law. As a matter of tax policy,
deductions are available for charitable giving to encourage generous
philanthropy, but here society has gotten a bad deal—granting a large
tax deduction for a trivial gift.
As a matter of corporate and securities law, manipulative gifts
involve a powerful insider misusing her connections to the corporation
to personally profit—even though the ultimate result likely hurts the
corporation and its other shareholders.22 Insider trading makes the
market a more dangerous place for noninsiders.23 Because charities
resell the gifts they receive, insider giving leads to the same dangers as
insider trading, but one step removed. The effect is substantially the
same as if the insider had simply engaged in illegal insider trading—
selling securities despite knowing their imminent collapse—and
donating the proceeds. The U.S. Supreme Court said as much in one of
its most significant insider trading opinions—“The tip and trade
resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits
to the recipient”—without quite realizing that this association cast
aspersion on manipulative gifts.24
That manipulative giving is widespread and pernicious should be
of great interest to scholars and policymakers. One reason is that it
cries out for a solution. For example, the law is currently structured on
the premise that gifts present few opportunities for abuse.25 The data
show the opposite: gifts appear to be abused far more often than sales,
at least when large shareholders are concerned.26 The assumption of

21. Ownership Reports on Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders,
Exchange Act Release Nos. 34-26333 & 35-24768, 42 SEC Docket 464, 492 (Dec. 2, 1988).
22. Recall that suspicious transactions, like the large gift, helped spoil Kodak’s shot at the
government contract. Shaw, supra note 7.
23. Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Informed Trading and
Its Regulation, 43 J. CORP. L. 817, 855 (2018).
24. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
25. Ownership Reports on Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders, supra
note 21.
26. See infra Part III (showing that large shareholder sales do not display hallmarks of
manipulation).
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harmlessness must be questioned, and the lax regulatory environment
permitting this must be fixed.
But even apart from a direct solution, insider giving is grounds for
reflection. A longstanding debate in law and finance considers the good
and bad of having powerful shareholders: they reduce managerial
agency costs but extract private benefits.27 That literature focuses on
controlling shareholders,28 but the vast majority of the shareholders in
our set are not controllers. These findings shed light on a previously
unnoticed channel for private benefit extraction and suggest that
extraction occurs at far lower levels of ownership than previously
surmised.
Two other debates in contemporary corporate law concern the
role of constituency directors, who represent a single investor group,29
and the valence of hedge fund activism.30 Many scholars expect a
director nominated by a single investor to help that specific investor.31
This Article adds more grist for consideration: it appears that large
shareholders find ways to extract information from the directors and
executives beholden to them in order to deploy it for their own benefit.
That insider giving by shareholders was observable but
unobserved provides one more reason to attend to it. Manipulative
gifts currently face low risk of enforcement or prosecution, so insiders
likely feel safer utilizing material nonpublic information in that

27. E.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 505 (1999); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 785 (2003).
28
See supra note 27.
29. E.g., E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a
Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 763
(2008) (suggesting “that the standards of liability for breach of fiduciary duty should not change
in order to account for new or increasingly common circumstances implicating fiduciary duties”);
Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. U.
L. REV. 309, 312 (2013) (discussing the rise of constituency directors and analyzing their role in
the corporate environment).
30. Compare K.J. Martijn Cremers, Erasmo Giambona, Simone M. Sepe & Ye Wang,
Hedge Fund Activists: Value Creators or Good Stock Pickers? 1 (Jan. 21, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3614029 [https://perma.cc/JJE8-4E2D] (arguing that
activist hedge funds do not create value), with Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The
Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1089 (2015) (defending
activist hedge funds).
31. Cf. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling
Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1274 (2017) (“Corporate law has long relied on oversight
by independent directors—directors who have no ties to the controller or the company other than
their service on the board—over corporate decisions where the interests of the controller
substantially diverge from those of the company or its public investors . . . .”).
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domain. Unhidden insider giving is a hint at what shareholders know—
and what they may be doing outside of plain sight.
To address these issues, this Article proceeds as follows. Part I
offers a general discussion of giving—why people do it and how they
can use manipulative strategies to increase the value of their gifts to a
surprising degree. Part II explains why manipulative gifts, even when
illegal, pose rather little legal risk for insiders. Part III contains this
Article’s empirical findings. Part IV discusses tax and insider trading
policy to connect the dots on why manipulative giving is bad. Part V
offers proposals for reform followed by concluding remarks and
reflections on the implications of these findings for other debates.
I. TAKING STOCK OF STOCK GIFTS
Insider giving is about opportunism posing as, or at least muddled
with, ordinary philanthropy. This Part introduces the basic concepts
underlying charitable gifts, manipulative and otherwise. Section A
describes the principal ethical, psychological, and economic
motivations for gifts. Section B introduces reasons why a donor might
prefer to donate stock, rather than liquidating such stock and donating
the proceeds. One of those reasons is the differential legal treatment
of gifts and sales. As Section C explains, donating stock carries some
of the benefits of selling and may be appealing when it is impractical or
illegal to sell. Donors can use at least five different tactics to profit from
gifts, sidestepping constraints that would bar a similar sale. Section D
presents a taxonomy of these manipulative giving techniques.
A. Why People Give
Broadly speaking, people make philanthropic gifts for a
combination of three reasons: intrinsic, image, and extrinsic
motivation. Intrinsic motivation represents the subjective value of
donating for the sake of the recipient, which is shaped by the
individual’s altruism and other private preferences.32 Image motivation
represents the individual’s desire to be positively perceived by others.33
32. Dan Ariely, Anat Bracha & Stephan Meier, Doing Good or Doing Well? Image
Motivation and Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 544, 544 (2009).
33. Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 AM. ECON. REV.
1652, 1653–54 (2006); see also Zachary Grossman, Self-Signaling Versus Social-Signaling in
Giving 1–2 (Nov. 4, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7320x2cp
[https://perma.cc/J8R6-JFAV] (describing how social signaling, actions taken to influence others’
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Charities help allocate image in a variety of ways such as publishing
lists of donors34 or rewarding donors with a branded amenity, such as a
mug, tote bag,35 or coveted board seat.36 Extrinsic benefits include
rewards such as wealth and privileges. For example, it is commonly
understood that “donations” to educational institutions may incline
them to admit the donor’s child.37 The most salient extrinsic benefit
from giving comes from the Internal Revenue Code, which allows
individuals to reduce their taxable income by an amount approximately
equal to what they give to tax-exempt charities.38
The tax benefits from a gift are usually substantially less than the
value of the gift, so a person is rarely richer for having given. However,
individuals who value altruism or obtain reputation benefits from the
gift may find that the tax break sweetens the deal enough to make a
gift. For example, an individual who enjoys $800 worth of satisfaction
from altruism and reputation benefits from a $1,000 gift will not find
those benefits compelling; better to spend the $1,000 selfishly.39 But if
the individual can make a $1,000 gift (capturing the $800 in altruism
and consumption) and still retain $200 or more through tax reductions,
then the gift transaction looks like a good idea. A tax incentive
perceptions of oneself, and self-signaling, “efforts to maintain positive beliefs about oneself,”
underscore image motivation in the context of giving).
34. E.g., Annual Giving Leadership Society Honor Roll of Donors, HARVEY MUDD COLL.,
https://www.hmc.edu/campaign/how-to-give/annual-mudd-fundd/annual-giving-leadershipsociety/annual-giving-leadership-society-honor-roll-of-donors [https://perma.cc/CLG4-FS4L].
35. Adrienne Lafrance, How NPR Tote Bags Became a Thing, ATLANTIC (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-npr-tote-bags-became-a-thing/390657
[https://perma.cc/Z3Q5-EU7Q].
36. Eve Proper, Give or Get Off: The Role of Trustees in College Fundraising,
PHILANTHROPY & EDUC., Fall 2019, at 1, 1; Robin Pogrebin, Trustees Find Board Seats Are Still
Luxury Items, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/03/arts/03center.html
[https://perma.cc/XQL9-U8A3].
37. Louise Radnofsky, Many Colleges That Got Money Tainted by Admissions Scandal Still
Have It, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2019, 10:05 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/many-colleges-thatgot-money-tainted-by-admissions-scandal-still-have-it-11569510323 [https://perma.cc/N8ER-Q2WV].
38. The charitable contribution deduction is covered by 26 U.S.C. § 170, which falls within
Part VI of Subchapter B of the Internal Revenue Code called “Itemized Deductions for
Individuals and Corporations.” The Code has allowed individuals and corporations to deduct
charitable contributions from their taxable income since 1917 and 1935, respectively. What Is the
Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions?, TAX POL’Y CTR.: BRIEFING BOOK,
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-tax-treatment-charitable-contributions
[https://perma.cc/52G5-2VWC].
39. Here, we help ourselves to the convention of presenting degrees of satisfaction in dollarvalue terms. We do not intend to make contentious psychological claims, such as that individuals
actually reason using money as the baseline, particularly when altruism is a chief motivation.
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provides that extra nudge. At a 28 percent marginal tax rate, a $1,000
gift would save the donor $280 on taxes, making the charitable path a
great choice.
Although tax deductions are meant to offset the financial cost of
a gift only partially, a donor may enrich herself by donating if she
improperly overstates the value of the gift. For example, the U.S.
General Accounting Office found that half of automobile donors
overstate the value of their gift by a factor of 10.40 If a $1,000 deduction
is improperly taken for a $100 car, a giver subject to a 28 percent tax
rate would be enriched by $280 worth of avoided taxes.41 Such a giver
is richer than if she had sold the car for its fair market value of $100.
Tax law does not endeavor to enrich donors by more than they
donate,42 but it certainly can in unusual cases. And those unusual cases
are far more likely when property is given rather than cash, as the next
Section discusses.
B. What People Give
Although cash may seem like the most natural gift, charities will
often accept gifts of property, such as stock. If the charity would rather
have cash, it can then sell the gifted property. Of course, donors
inclined to dispose of stock could themselves sell the stock and then
donate the proceeds to the charity, but they will often find a direct gift
of stock more advantageous. Donations of securities are exempt from
capital gains taxes on any appreciation in value upon any sale.43 This
exemption from capital gains taxation amounts to a second tax benefit,
on top of the deduction available for charitable gifts. For example, a
security purchased for $100 and sold for $1,000 would represent a $900
capital gain. With a long-term capital gains rate of 20 percent, the seller
would net only $820 from the transaction. Giving up $1,000 to send

40. Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good Charities:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 108th Cong. 18 (2004) (statement of Hon. Mark Everson,
Comm’r, IRS, Washington, D.C.).
41. 28 percent is the alternative minimum tax, a federal income tax that acts as the marginal
rate for many high-income individuals. In fact, the savings may be higher or lower. Someone
subject to state income tax would see a reduction in that tax as well. And appreciated assets are
usually deducted without any tax on the unrealized appreciation.
42. Infra Part.IV.A.
43. E.g., MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 214 (14th ed. 2018).
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$820 to a charity is obviously worse than sending $1,000, regardless of
why one gives.
Two other reasons encourage gifts of property. First, the fair
market value of property may be debatable, permitting donors to
improperly misstate the value of their deductible gifts.44 Accordingly,
Treasury Regulations show meaningful skepticism regarding the
valuation of property gifts in general,45 and stock in particular.46
Importantly for the purposes of this Article, Treasury Regulations
impose no special appraisal burden on the valuation of marketable
securities, for which a stock exchange provides active trading prices.
The stock’s fair market value is simply that day’s trading price.47 There
is no flexibility for the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) or taxpayer
to argue for a different valuation, on the theory that there is no serious
risk of overvaluation in this context.
There is a second reason donors sometimes prefer gifts of stock,
having nothing to do with debatable valuation: selling the stock
(whether to fund a donation or consumption) may be illegal or risky. It
is to that second reason we now turn.
C. Giving as a Substitute for Selling
The second reason why a donor may prefer to give property rather
than sell it (perhaps donating the proceeds) is that selling may be
44. Suppose that the fair value of some private shares is $0.001, but they are valued at
$0.0000001 for tax purposes. Making a $2,000 IRA contribution at this low value per share can
inflate subsequent tax benefits by 10,000-fold when shares publicly trade later at fair market value
and create $100 million IRA accounts. See S. Burcu Avci, M. P. Narayanan & H. Nejat Seyhun,
How Should Retirement Plans Be Organized, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 337, 382 (2017); see also U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-16, INDIVIDUAL RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS: IRS
COULD BOLSTER ENFORCEMENT ON MULTIMILLION DOLLAR ACCOUNTS, BUT MORE
DIRECTION FROM CONGRESS IS NEEDED 41 (2014) (demonstrating the advantage of investing in
assets valued very low with high returns if successful).
45. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(11)(B); 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(b)(3)(i) (2020).
46. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(b)(3)(i) (2020). Deductions for the charitable contribution of
stock are generally measured based on the fair market value of the stock at the time of
contribution. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1(c)(1) (2020). If there were no stock exchange sales on the
contribution date, taxpayers can rely on the selling prices within a reasonable period before and
after the contribution date. Id. § 20.2031-2(b)(1) (2020). More specifically, fair market value is
calculated based on the average of the highest and lowest selling prices on the nearest possible
dates with sales before and after the contribution date. Id. The taxpayer then takes the weighted
average of these two daily averages, based on the number of trading days from the contribution
date. Id. § 20.2031-2(b)(2) (2020).
47. Id. § 20.2031-2(b)(1) (2020). More precisely, the value is generally the midpoint of the
highest and lowest prices at which the security traded on the day of the gift. Id.
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illegal, attract adverse media attention, or both. Insider trading is
plainly illegal.48 A gift of $1,000 that captures $460 in tax benefits may
be preferable to a sale for $1,000 and an adverse mention in the Wall
Street Journal or a prison sentence.
These latter reasons (overvaluation and legal restrictions) could
work in concert. Imagine a shareholder who knew for certain that a
$1,000 stock’s fair market value was really 32.5 percent of its current
market price; tomorrow morning, the facts undergirding this
skepticism will be made public, and the price will surely fall. Such an
investor has three options. First, she could wait until the stock falls to
$325, accepting a $675 loss. Then, when she sells the depreciated stock,
she will still owe taxes, netting her $280 post-tax.49 Second, she could
sell her $1,000 stake today, netting $820.50 But in doing so, she may
violate numerous civil and criminal prohibitions. Even if she beats
those charges, the embarrassment and stress of facing them serves as a
potent deterrent.
Here is a third option: give a gift of stock to a charity, claiming a
$1,000 deduction and avoiding capital gains taxes. Amazingly, the
shareholder would then net the same amount by giving the gift as by
selling the stock—$280 in tax-adjusted profits cash in hand. That is
because her taxes would be reduced by 28 percent of the $1,000 value
claimed. She would also likely avoid legal and reputational risk, all with
the satisfaction of supporting a charity that has feted her. Indeed, if the
share price were slated to fall to below $325, she would be strictly better
off by donating than by waiting to sell.51 Her tax savings from the gift
would exceed the postdrop sale proceeds. When price drops are likely
to be large, donating stock strictly dominates patient sales, even for
taxpayers with no intrinsic or reputational interest in charity.
Whether as a substitute for illegal selling (making a smaller profit
with less legal and reputation risk) or legal, patient selling (making
large tax-adjusted benefit with greater intrinsic and reputational

48. Infra Part II.
49. We assume for each example a 20 percent capital gains rate on stock originally obtained
for $100. Thus, the sale will realize $225 in capital gains and, thus, a $45 capital gains tax.
50. Here, again, we assume 28 percent income tax and 20 percent capital gains imposed on
stock that has appreciated ten times since purchase.
51. Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REV. 1133, 1159 (2008)
(emphasizing that, as a result of valuation abuse, “[m]any taxpayers, in effect, are provided with
the equivalent of a deduction equal to much more than 100 cents for each dollar of property value
given to charity” (quoting George K. Yin, JCT Chief Discusses the Tax Gap, 107 TAX NOTES
1449, 1450 (2005))).
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gains), it is plain that stock gifts can sometimes substitute for other
forms of disposition. The next Section explains the mechanics and
conditions associated with gifts at their most attractive, for investors
who are not content with mere luck.
D. A Taxonomy of Manipulative Giving
When it comes to gifts of stock, it is better to be lucky than good.
But where there is neither luck nor goodness, there is manipulation.
This Section describes three manipulative strategies donors can use to
unlock surprising tax benefits from their gifts: using material nonpublic
information to time a gift; leaning on management to delay (or
accelerate) disclosures; or fraudulently pretending that a transaction
took place on a different day than it did. We call these strategies
information, influence, and backdating, respectively. The former two
are access strategies that presume insiders have a cordial relationship
with corporate management. The latter requires no access to
management—the fraud is based on falsely reporting the date of the
transaction.
To understand these three strategies, consider a gift that attracted
ample attention some years ago—George Soros’s donation of $192
million worth of JetBlue stock. The basic facts of the case are simple
and uncontested. For the purposes of this illustration, several small
additions (which are clearly identified) are imagined to highlight
several manipulative possibilities. These three strategies are not
mutually exclusive, as discussed in the final Section.52

52. Nor are shareholder gift transactions the only possible strategy; insiders also sold stock
during this period. See JetBlue Airways Corp., Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership
(Form 4) (Nov. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Soros’s Nov. 3, 2003 Form 4], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1158463/000090020303000019/xslF345X03/edgar.xml [https://perma.cc/675D-V2KF]
(filing for George Soros). There was also a stark increase in insider reports beginning in late
November and continuing into early December. An Edgar search reveals 54 Form 4s filed for
JetBlue from October 1, 2003 through December 31, 2003—the vast majority of which were sales.
See Search Results for JetBlue Airways Corp., EDGAR, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search/?r=el#
[https://perma.cc/DP2W-ZFPY] (select “custom” date range and narrow file dates from October
1, 2003 to December 31, 2003, then refine search results by form type 4). Of those insider reports,
17 were filed for October, 18 for November, and 19 for December. Id. Also, there were seven gifts
by JetBlue insiders filed in February 2004 reporting for December 31, 2003. See Search Results
for JetBlue Airways Corp., EDGAR, https://www.sec.gov/edgar/search/?r=el# [https://perma.cc/
T3G2-SXSB] (select “custom” date range and narrow file dates from December 1, 2003 to June
1, 2004, then refine search results by form type 5).
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1. The Facts. George Soros rose to fame and wealth betting on
currency in the 1990s,53 but he also served as one of JetBlue’s earliest
investors.54 Two of Soros’s close associates served as directors of
JetBlue beginning in 1998.55 On November 3, 2003, Soros filed a Form
4 documenting a large gift of 2.9 million shares.56 It listed the gift date
as October 9, 2003.57 On that date, JetBlue shares were trading at an
average price of $66.50, valuing the gift at $192 million.58 Soros
obtained those shares for about five dollars.59 Thus, he would have
realized $61.50 per share in profit had he instead sold on that day. By
instead giving shares, Soros plausibly obtained tax benefits of $30.92
53. Steve Schaefer, Forbes Flashback: How George Soros Broke the British Pound and Why
Hedge Funds Probably Can’t Crack the Euro, FORBES (July 7, 2015, 11:40 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2015/07/07/forbes-flashback-george-soros-britishpound-euro-ecb/?sh=459f24206131 [https://perma.cc/J45P-SLQL].
54. Jet Blue Skies, FORBES (Jan. 31, 2001, 12:01 AM), https://www.forbes.com/2001/01/
31/0131jetblue.html?sh=35b0e46d12fa [https://perma.cc/YX5G-WASJ]; Soros and JetBlue
Founder Sell Some Holdings, REUTERS (June 4, 2007, 3:47 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/jetblue-soros/soros-and-jetblue-founder-sell-some-holdings-idUSN0420189920070604
[https://perma.cc/PM9X-KUMX]; Soros To Help Fund New Low-Cost Airline, L.A. TIMES (July
14, 1999, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1999-jul-14-fi-55803-story.html
[https://perma.cc/P3TP-AYFP].
55. One had served as a managing partner and later a senior advisor for Soros Fund
Management LLC, and he also served as a managing director for Soros Private Funds
Management LLC from 2001 to 2003. JetBlue Airways Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 7
(Apr. 18, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001158463/000104746905010540/
a2155413zdef14a.htm [https://perma.cc/CQ6F-2VMP]. The other served as a cohead of the Soros
Private Equity division of Soros Fund Management LLC since 1998. Id. at 8.
56. Soros’s Nov. 3, 2003 Form 4, supra note 52.
57. Id. Soros also filed a number of Form 4s to report sales of JetBlue stock in December
2004. None reported any gifts. See, e.g., JetBlue Airways Corp., Statement of Changes in
Beneficial Ownership (Form 4) (Dec. 12, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
0000900203/000090020304000026/xslF345X03/edgar.xml [https://perma.cc/NPS6-D2GX] (filing
for George Soros).
58. The story is simplified in two trivial ways. First, the stock was actually trading higher
than $66.50—it closed at $70.26. JetBlue Airways - Stock Split History | JBLU, MACROTRENDS,
https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/JBLU/jetblue-airways/stock-splits [https://perma.cc/554BCT8V]. However, IRS rules required Soros to take the midpoint of opening and closing price.
Second, the arithmetic that follows takes place over a period of time in which stock splits took
place. There were two 3:2 stock splits. Historical Prices, JETBLUE, http://
blueir.investproductions.com/investor-relations/stock-information/historical-prices [https://perma.cc/
4WK2-AQB6]. All the subsequent figures use split-adjusted prices. The method used to obtain
the dollar values in this section is to multiply the historical stock price reported by JetBlue by 1.5
for each of two stock splits where appropriate.
59. Beth Piskora, JetBlue Takes Off IPO Skyrockets 67%; Soros Makes A Mint, N.Y. POST
(Apr. 13, 2002, 4:00 AM), https://nypost.com/2002/04/13/jetblue-takes-off-ipo-skyrockets-67soros-makes-a-mint [https://perma.cc/QUR7-HZG2] (stating that Soros’s average cost per share
was five dollars).
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per share or about $90 million.60 He was able to support a charity he
cares about61 and garner the superlative praise as Forbes Magazine’s
“most generous giver.”62
The gift attracted attention because it was especially well timed.
JetBlue stock prices spiked on precisely October 9, never before or
since climbing to such heights.63 The next sections proceed to unpack
more events—some real, some supposed—that serve as case studies in
manipulative giving.
2. Using Information to Time Gifts. JetBlue was doing well early
in 2003. It entered Atlanta in May 200364 and announced in September
2003 its plans to begin service at Boston’s Logan Airport.65 But there
were also signs of trouble. JetBlue had violated its own privacy policy
by transferring its passenger data to a private defense contractor.66
Class action lawsuits were filed on September 22.67
Now imagine the following hypothetical. Say a major shareholder,
let’s call him Smith, decided around September 22, when the stock
price was $57.96, that it was time to sell his shares or make a substantial
gift. Making a gift would yield tax savings of $26.82 per share, for a total
60. He would have owed 20 percent of $61.50 appreciation. That $12.30 capital gains tax is
avoided through giving. And then he can deduct $66.50 per share, which reduces the amount of
income subject to a 28 percent marginal rate, for an additional $18.62 in tax savings.
61. The shares went to the Open Society Institute, the charitable trust Mr. Soros uses for
most of his giving. Soros’s Nov. 3, 2003 Form 4, supra note 52.
62. Jennifer Wang, The New Forbes Philanthropy Score: How We Ranked Each Forbes 400
Billionaire Based on Their Giving, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2020, 6:10 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/jenniferwang/2020/09/08/the-new-forbes-philanthropy-score-how-we-ranked-each-forbes400-billionaire-based-on-their-giving/?sh=1492b7929eba [https://perma.cc/2FQW-3N2E].
63. MACROTRENDS, supra note 58.
64. Kelly Yamanouchi, How JetBlue Is Expanding in Atlanta, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (Sept. 6,
2017), https://www.ajc.com/blog/airport/how-jetblue-expanding-atlanta/F8GTbw7Swze0EKmTr8YNAP
[https://perma.cc/N9YL-YAH6].
65. JetBlue Airways Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-K) 19 (Oct. 27, 2003),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001158463/000104746903034461/a2120967z10-q.htm
[https://perma.cc/5Z6T-Z9HC].
66. Ryan Singel, Army Quietly Opens JetBlue Probe, WIRED (Nov. 26, 2003, 2:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2003/11/army-quietly-opens-jetblue-probe [https://perma.cc/L6WV-FKU9].
67. Press Release, JetBlue, JetBlue Retains Deloitte & Touche To Assist the Airline in Its
Analysis of Its Privacy Policy; Airline Confirms It Will Not Be a Test Airline for CAPPS II (Sept.
22,
2003),
http://mediaroom.jetblue.com/investor-relations/press-releases/2003/09-22-2003015145604 [https://perma.cc/YY7V-J5QV]; Bloomberg News, Company News; JetBlue Sued Over
Release of Passenger Data, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/24/
business/company-news-jetblue-sued-over-release-of-passenger-data.html [https://perma.cc/3UGPHQ7D].
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of $78 million.68 One can likewise imagine Smith discussing the plans
with JetBlue directors. Those directors could mention that JetBlue
plans to announce a stock split by October 7, with a positive
management assessment of its bright future growth prospects.69 They
may also have heard early rumors that JetBlue would be named
America’s best airline by Conde Nast on October 10.70 They might have
urged Smith to delay his gift a few weeks. As things turned out, waiting
three weeks would increase the value of his tax savings by 15 percent
or $12 million.71
The previous scenario envisioned Smith delaying a planned gift to
capture the eventual disclosure of management-manufactured good
news. We call such delay a waiting game strategy. There are
possibilities in the opposite direction, too, such as moving a gift forward
to beat out trouble, which we denote as gun-jumping.
Suppose that Smith met on October 9 with his friends on the
JetBlue board to congratulate them on the bumper quarter and to let
them know about his plans to make a large gift of stock in a few weeks.
Those directors would have likely known that JetBlue was in for a
bumpy ride until the end of the year: in two weeks, JPMorgan would
downgrade JetBlue’s stock, noting reduced opportunity at John F.
Kennedy Airport and increased competition from Delta.72 Beginning
on October 23, reports would leak that JetBlue was scheduled to end
the much-vaunted Atlanta service on December 4 in response to
increased competition.73 Presumably, that decision was already in the

68. The sale gains are $57.96 − $5. The tax benefits are $52.96 × 0.2 ($10.59) in avoided
capital gains and $57.96 × 0.28 ($16.23) in income tax deductions.
69. The 10-Q stated that the board declared the split on October 6. JetBlue Airways Corp.,
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 22 (Oct. 27, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
0001158463/000104746903034461/a2120967z10-q.htm. [https://perma.cc/X38F-RDCV].
70. Press Release, JetBlue, JetBlue Named Best U.S. Airline by Conde Nast Traveler
Readers; Low-Fare Carrier Tops Readers’ Choice Awards 2nd Year Running and Ranks as One
of World’s Top Three Airlines (Oct. 10, 2003), http://mediaroom.jetblue.com/investorrelations/press-releases/2003/10-10-2003-015144948 [https://perma.cc/5DUV-2JCQ].
71. At that point, the shares were worth $66.50 per share, yielding tax savings of $30.92.
Supra note 60. $30.92 is 15 percent higher than $26.82. The total tax savings of $90 million is $12
million more than $78 million.
72. J.P. Morgan Lowers JetBlue Airways to ‘Underweight,’ BLOOMBERG (Oct. 24, 2003,
12:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2003-10-23/j-dot-p-dot-morgan-lowersjetblue-airways-to-underweight [https://perma.cc/8AWV-GFVD]; Deshundra Jefferson, JetBlue
Tumbles on Downgrade, CNN MONEY (Oct. 24, 2003, 6:15 PM), https://money.cnn.com/
2003/10/24/news/companies/jetblue/index.htm [https://perma.cc/QN65-DNEA].
73. J.P. Morgan Lowers JetBlue Airways to ‘Underweight’, supra note 72; Jefferson, supra
note 72.

VERSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

INSIDER GIVING

11/16/2021 10:21 AM

637

works on October 9. If friends urged Smith to give his shares early, on
October 9, he could deduct $66.50 per share, rather than the
postdisclosure prices in the $54–56 range. As with delaying his gift
(waiting game), accelerating his gift (gun-jumping) could have netted
Smith more than $10 million in additional tax benefits.
3. Using Influence To Time Corporate Disclosures. In the previous
scenarios, Smith’s choice of gift date was flexible, but the board’s
decision to make announcements was taken for granted. But it could
be the other way around, with Smith intent upon an October 9 gift
(perhaps to meet a prior pledged commitment), and the board having
some freedom about when news is disclosed. Instead of Smith
contacting friends to fish for information about when to give, he could
call to let them know his preferences with the understanding that they
would bring JetBlue into accord wherever possible. We can call it bullet
dodging if executives delay bad news to suit a donor’s plans and spring
loading if they accelerate good news.
For example, the board announced a three-for-two stock split
(with a favorable growth outlook from the management) on October 7
to the market’s general acclaim.74 But perhaps that announcement was
initially planned for October 14. Perhaps it was accelerated by a week
to help Smith’s gift transaction. Conversely, JetBlue’s termination of
Atlanta service could have been planned for disclosure early in
October—say, two months before the closure would actually occur—
but the board might have delayed the negative announcement by a few
weeks, increasing the number of customers whose post-December
tickets would have been canceled but improving Smith’s gift prospects.
Speaking generally, delaying disappointing disclosures until after
gifts are made will inflate their value just as much as accelerating gifts
to precede the disappointing disclosure. Likewise, accelerating positive
disclosures improves the value of subsequent gifts by the same amount
as delayed gifts would. Powerful shareholders may have access to
information they can use to time their gifts and enough influence to
alter the timing of disclosures.
These four strategies—waiting game, gun-jumping, bullet
dodging, and spring loading—are all forms of access strategies, which

74. Press Release, JetBlue, JetBlue Airways Announces Three-for-Two Stock Split (Oct. 7,
2003), http://mediaroom.jetblue.com/investor-relations/press-releases/2003/10-07-2003-015145276
[https://perma.cc/6AG4-UZR4] (“The three-for-two stock split reflects our confidence in the
Company’s future growth prospects . . . .”).
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depend on a close relationship between shareholders and
management. Table 1 summarizes the four options already described,
before proceeding with a rather different method of manipulating gift
values.
Table 1: Access Strategies

Good News
Bad News

Information Leakage Disclosure Influence
Accelerate
Delay Gift
Disclosure (spring
(waiting game)
loading)
Accelerate Gift
Delay Disclosure
(gun-jumping)
(bullet dodging)

4. Backdating. Suppose now that JetBlue’s board neither spirited
information to Smith nor adjusted corporate policy to suit his giving
plans. Instead, Smith merely noticed on November 3 that his JetBlue
stock had been through a rough patch because of the downgrade and
the loss of Atlanta. As a result, JetBlue was trading at $54.26, down
more than $10 from just a few weeks prior, so that Smith’s shares were
worth about $157 million.
In this scenario, Smith could sell his shares that day and obtain
about $129 million to keep or give away. A second option would be to
donate it to his foundation today and obtain tax benefits worth $72
million.75 A third option involves backdating. He could decide
retroactively that his gift had occurred three weeks prior on October 9,
when the stock was worth $192 million. To do this, he would record the
gift as made on October 9 on the Form 4, which he will file with the
SEC on November 3. By penciling in the wrong date for the gift, Smith
could still give $157 million to the foundation he supports but claim tax
benefits worth $90 million, an increase of almost 50 percent or $18
million.
Backdating is qualitatively different from the previous
manipulative giving strategies. It does not depend on access to
management for the strategic timing of disclosures or donations. This

75. $157 million × 0.28 amounts to a $44.0 million income tax reduction, plus (54.26 − 5) ×
2.9 million × 0.2, or $28.6 million in avoided capital gains.
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means that backdating is not inherently cooperative. An individual can
decide to harvest tax benefits from backdating without any accomplice.
The donor simply misreports the gift date on their SEC filing and then
claims the deduction associated with that date.76
Accordingly, backdating is not a substitute for insider trading.
However, it is a substitute to other forms of manipulative giving that
are substitutes of insider trading. It is also complementary because
backdating can be used alongside other giving strategies. The next
Section explains how layering backdating on top of other strategies can
amplify an insider’s gains from giving.
5. A Combination of Manipulative Strategies. These manipulative
strategies are not mutually exclusive: an insider can use information,
influence, and backdating in the same gift. To see this, consider what
happened a month after Smith’s November 3 filing: a stupendous drop
in altitude for the stock price, down to $38.79 (about a 45 percent drop
from October 9), owing to the turbulent events beyond the company’s
control. On December 4, JetBlue announced “a challenging revenue
environment” related to “depressed traffic to southern California
earlier this quarter due to the fires there.”77 All those fires had begun

76. Importantly, the insider need not secure the complicity of the recipient charity. A
foundation that receives a gift on November 3 is not obliged to corroborate the donor’s fraudulent
Form 4 declaration or tax filing, in which October 4 is presented as the gift date. The foundation
does not coauthor those documents and has no incentive to proactively request these documents
and report discrepancies to the government. Most foundations do not make a public filing of their
received gifts that the SEC can audit and associate with purported gift dates. Although public
charities must annually disclose to the IRS what donations they receive each year, the IRS is
forbidden from sharing this information. Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting
Requirements of Exempt Organizations, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,959, 31,963 (May 28, 2020) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 and 56); New IRS Rule Allows Many Nonprofits To Withhold Donor
Information From the IRS, NOSSAMAN LLP (May 28, 2020), https://www.nossaman.com/
newsroom-insights-new-irs-rule-allows-many-nonprofits-to-withhold-donor-iInformation-fromthe-IRS [https://perma.cc/6A9K-4PAS]. For private foundations, the donor and gift date are
publicly available, Schedule of Contributors (Schedule B), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f990ezb.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3VJ-AWWV], but there is no easy way to search this data and
reconcile it with Form 4 and Form 5 filings. Construction of such a database would be useful for
scholars and regulators going forward.
77. Press Release, JetBlue, JetBlue Airways Reports November Traffic; Revises Fourth
Quarter Earnings Guidance (Dec. 4, 2003), http://mediaroom.jetblue.com/investor-relations/
press-releases/2003/12-04-2003-015143526 [https://perma.cc/2BU6-959M]; JetBlue Airways
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 4, 2003), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
0001158463/000104746903039481/a2124113z8-k.htm [https://perma.cc/3Y5A-VUEW].
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by November 3,78 suggesting that the board already knew on November
3 that JetBlue was going to have a hard time for the rest of the year.
Suppose that Smith had met in November with his two associates
on the board of JetBlue and indicated that he would make a year-end
sale or gift of stock. One can imagine the directors firmly reminding
Smith that California has had a tragic autumn and that the events
surely would impact an air carrier. Taking the hint, Smith might decide
to accelerate his gift by a month. Having resolved to jump the gun, he
might nevertheless backdate the gift from November 3 to October 9 to
take advantage of the high price with perfect hindsight. Finally, he
might discourage the board from making negative disclosures about
the impact of the fires for a few days to draw less attention to the
excellent timing of the transaction and ensure that he dodges the bullet.
This combination of strategies would allow Smith to give stock
worth $157 million but claim a $192 million deduction worth $90
million in tax savings.79 He would avoid having to give at the low
December price of $38.79, which would have left the foundation with
only $112 million and delivered tax savings of only $51.1 million.80 The
combination of backdating and access strategies almost double the
value of Smith’s tax benefits. Indeed, the sale price for the stock in
December would have been only slightly greater than the tax benefit
obtained in November. Thus, Smith obtained $90 million in tax
savings,81 while still making a jaw-dropping gift to a charity he controls,
compared to only $112 million from an outright sale. Had the stock

78. Hayley Fox, 2003 Wildfires: Memories Linger, Firefighting Techniques Evolve After the
Largest Fire in California History (Map), KPCC (Oct. 25, 2013), https://archive.kpcc.org/news/
2013/10/25/39939/2003-wildfires-10-years-after-the-largest-fire-in [https://perma.cc/49LH-3KEB].
79. Recall that a gift of stock worth $192 million reduces the donor’s income by that amount,
saving the donor the marginal tax rate times the gift (here $192 million × 0.28 = $54 million). Such
a gift also avoids the capital gains tax that would occur if a sale and gift of cash were made. The
savings is $36 million if we take $192 million to be the relevant baseline ($192 − (2.9 million shares
× $5 basis) × 0.2), giving a total tax benefit of $90 million. One might instead consider the capital
gains from a December sale as the relevant savings. In that case, the capital gains avoided would
be worth 0.2 × ($38.79 − $5) which is $6.76 per share or $19.6 million. The total tax savings would
be $74 million, rather than $90 million.
80. The foundation would get $112 million because that is the December share price
($38.79) times the number of shares (2.9 million). Avoided capital gains of .2 × ($38.79 − $5) are
worth $6.76 per share. Add to that reduced income of $38.79 × .28 worth $10.86 per share, and
the total tax benefit is $17.62 per share.
81. Supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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price fallen a little further, to $31 or below, he would have netted more
money from a manipulative gift than an honest sale.82
As this scenario illustrates, multiple manipulative strategies can
work in concert. About half of the value of Smith’s increased tax
benefits could come from access strategies and half from backdating.
To reiterate, this Article does not claim that Soros or anyone at JetBlue
actually used these manipulative strategies. Rather, the intent is to
explain these strategies in a hypothetical situation about a similarly
situated shareholder.83 Moreover, a prominent investor would be
unwise to use manipulative strategies if they pose a large legal and
reputational risk. The next Part turns to the legality of these gifts.
II. THE LAW OF INSIDER GIVING
It has been said that “there’s no law against insider giving.”84 This
is untrue. Numerous laws bear on insider giving, exposing the
manipulative insider and those who abet her to civil and criminal
liability. However, it is fair to say that the law on manipulative giving
is somewhat more permissive than the law on insider trading, and it is
certainly true that the odds of detection and prosecution are much
lower for strategic gifts than sales. Accordingly, the law may
inadvertently encourage insiders to consider manipulative giving a
viable option.
Several bodies of law bear on insider trading, insider giving, and
gifts of stock generally. The laws governing this domain regulate
information sharing, use of information in transactions, suspect trading

82. At $31 per share, a sale yields less than $90 million. But as the hypothetical showed,
Smith would make $90 million in tax savings from the gift. The break-even point is higher (a gift
is more attractive than a sale) if the marginal tax rate is treated as higher than 28 percent. At 45
percent, the tax savings grow to $192 million × 0.45 = $86.4 million plus the capital gains savings
of $36 million. The total tax savings is then $122.4 million, which is the amount realized by a sale
at $42.21 per share. The break-even price is lower if a different capital gains baseline is used for
comparison.
83. See Andrea Fuller, Hundreds of People Made Gifts of Stock with Great Timing, WALL
ST. J. (Dec. 21, 2017, 1:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hundreds-of-people-made-gifts-ofstock-with-great-timing-1513881239 [https://perma.cc/7F9M-2XXM] (chronicling how hundreds
of people donated stock to charities near price peaks to take advantage of potential tax
deductions).
84. Francis et al., supra note 5. This view is widespread. It depends in part upon an undue
focus on just insider trading jurisprudence under SEC Rule 10b-5. While we argue that even 10b5 may allow insider giving liability, it is far from the only applicable legal rule. We discuss both
points in this Part.
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(even if lacking inside information), disclosure of transactions, and tax
treatment of charitable gifts. This Part reviews the law governing those
functional operations, one by one, with an eye to their application to
manipulative giving. Section A describes federal and state rules
discouraging selective disclosure of material nonpublic information
that might support gifts. Section B describes federal law constraining
transactions, such as sales and gifts. Section C goes on to discuss the
federally mandated public disclosure of gifts, and Section D explains
valuation rules for gifts under federal tax law.
A. Disclosure Rules
Federal securities law requires issuers to share information in
some contexts but forbids it in others.85 State corporate law likewise
sets out rules for transparency and opacity. In both contexts, the
operating policy favors some measure of equal access to information,
albeit under different conceptions. Securities law favors equal access
by all potential traders, while corporate law favors equal access by all
investors. If effective, each of these disclosure rules would cut down on
inappropriate selective sharing of corporate information and the
trading and gifting that may follow. However, these rules operate
differently for gifts than trades and are certainly less restrictive.
1. Securities Law Disfavors Selective Disclosure for Insider Giving.
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
establish a system of mandatory disclosure.86 Businesses must disclose
vast quantities of information when selling securities to the public87 and
quarterly thereafter,88 with occasional updates for specific events.89 In
general, additional disclosures are permitted, and even selective
disclosures—with management leaking secrets to a favored financial

85. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 3 (2001) (describing information that is forbidden to be disclosed such as certain pending
offerings).
86. Cf. Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
599, 605 (2013) (remarking that disclosure is the essence of federal securities law).
87. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(b)–(c), 78l; 17 C.F.R. § 230.404 (2020) (providing a list of
information that must be disclosed).
88. See Form 10-Q, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308a (2020) (denoting rules for quarterly reports); see
also Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2020) (same for annual and transition reports).
89. See Form 8-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.308 (2021) (form for disclosure of information required
by Regulation FD).
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analyst to curry favor—appear to be contemplated.90 Nevertheless a
number of limitations apply.91
Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Regulation FD”) was promulgated
in response to a widespread perception that executives were able to
corrupt stock analysts by offering them preferential access to
information; the analysts then parlayed this information on to their
trading clients, who would scoop the market.92 Regulation FD
accordingly forbids issuers from disclosing material nonpublic
information to many kinds of market professionals.93 Importantly,
Regulation FD bars selective disclosure to institutional investors, such
as hedge funds, even if there is no hint that the disclosure will lead to a
sale.94
However, Regulation FD applies differently to individual
investors who are not among the enumerated market professionals.
The rule only constrains selective disclosures to such investors “under
circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that the person will
purchase or sell the issuer’s securities on the basis of the information.”95
Thus, Regulation FD does not prohibit disclosure when it is reasonable
to think that the listener would not buy or sell.96 Does a giver of
securities “sell” them for the purposes of Regulation FD? There is no
law directly on point. It is probable that a court would reason by
analogy from SEC Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence. This jurisprudence is
discussed in Section 2.B.2, but it is fair to say there is substantial

90. Powell famously built this rationale into Dirks, the case originating the contemporary
law of insider trading for tippers and tippees. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657–79 (1983); see
also Michael D. Guttentag, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 69 FLA. L. REV. 519, 551–65
(2017) (criticizing the continued use of this rationale and the personal benefit test based on it).
91. See Mahoney, supra note 85, at 3 (describing the information forbidden to be disclosed).
92. See Fact Sheet: Regulation Fair Disclosure and New Insider Trading Rules, SEC (Aug.
10, 2000), https://www.sec.gov/news/extra/seldsfct.htm [https://perma.cc/AE7T-V6XB].
93. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2020) (“Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on its behalf,
discloses any material nonpublic information . . . the issuer shall make public disclosure of that
information . . . .”). Among the market professionals are brokers, dealers, investment advisors,
investment managers, and investment companies, and their various affiliates. Id. § 243.100(b)(1)
(2020).
94. Id. § 243.100(b)(1)(ii–iii) (2020).
95. Id. § 243.100(b)(1)(iv) (2020).
96. To be sure, there is a reasonable case that gifts are sales, so prudent executives might
honor Regulation FD’s spirit by staying mum. Moreover, it is a fair question why executives would
not reasonably foresee a sale when delivering bad news to an investor—given how many people
are initially skeptical of insider giving as a substitute for insider trading, it may be more reasonable
to expect trading.
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uncertainty on the point.97 Regardless, executives may think that it is
somewhat safe to share information with natural persons owning
significant stakes in their companies because such persons are often not
among the restricted market professionals, so sharing with them is not
a per se violation of Regulation FD.
2. Corporate Law Disfavors Selective Disclosure for Insider
Giving. State corporate law vests shareholders with rights to obtain
information about the businesses of which they hold shares.98 Most
prominent among the shareholder’s arsenal is the books and records
request,99 which permits a shareholder to demand, review, and copy
many kinds of corporate information in order to value their investment
or for some other lawful purpose.100 And beyond the statutory
framework, shareholders can use contracts to secure greater
information rights or utilize informal ties to executives to simply ask
for more.101 Moreover, corporate law sometimes permits officers and
directors to share information selectively, especially with the
shareholder who advocated for their inclusion in the company’s
management.102
However, shareholder information access is not unlimited. “The
directors’ duty to disclose all available material information in
connection with a request for shareholder action must be balanced

97.
98.

Infra Part II.B.2.
LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ANDREW VERSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: A SYSTEMS
APPROACH 273 (2020).
99. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2020) (describing the rights of stockholders to make
copies of books and records).
100. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Lebanon Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Fund, 243 A.3d 417, 425 (Del.
2020).
101. Infra notes 278–79 and accompanying text.
102. Kalisman v. Friedman, No. 8447–VCL, 2013 WL 1668205, at *6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2013)
(“When a director serves as the designee of a stockholder on the board, and when it is understood
that the director acts as the stockholder’s representative, then the stockholder is generally entitled
to the same information as the director.”); see Kortum v. Webasto Sunroofs, Inc., 769 A.2d 113,
122 (Del. Ch. 2000) (endorsing that director was duty-bound to share the information with the
shareholder who nominated him); see also J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights
and Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70 BUS. LAW. 33, 56 (2015) (“The better approach, which
Delaware has adopted, is therefore to permit information sharing and allow corporations to
address risks by contracting with the affiliate and by enforcing the directors’ fiduciary duties.”);
Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, “Captured Boards”: The Rise of “Super Directors” and the Case for a
Board Suite, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 19, 45 (“Absent contractual provisions to the contrary, Delaware
law permits constituent directors to disclose information to their sponsors so long as they do so in
a manner that is consistent with their fiduciary duties.”).
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against its concomitant duty to protect the corporate enterprise, in
particular, by keeping certain financial information confidential.”103
Apart from the threshold question of whether it is appropriate for any
particular item to be disclosed, a separate question concerns whether
officers and directors breach their duties by disclosing to just select
shareholders.104 Corporate law tends to emphasize equality among
shareholders.105 For example, transactions in which a powerful
shareholder obtains different benefits than the rest of the group are
often subject to challenge under the exacting entire fairness
standard.106 Directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the
shareholders as a class, even when they have deep ties to a particular
shareholder.107 These rules establish a strong norm against selective
disclosure of information to just the shareholders employing or
sponsoring “constituency” directors.108

103. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998).
104. See generally Cyril Moscow, Director Confidentiality, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 197
(2011) (exploring the idea that there might be exceptions to blanket rule of confidentiality).
105. See David M. Morris, Lois Herzeca & Julie E. Kamps, Designated Directors and
Designating Investors: Early Planning Is Key, 16 CORP. GOVERNANCE ADVISOR 5, 5 (2008)
(“Under New York and Delaware law, designated directors (also known as ‘representative’ or
‘constituency’ directors) have the same fiduciary duties as other directors to the corporations on
whose board they serve.”); see also Williamson v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., No. 1663-N, 2006 WL
1586375, at *4 n.49 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2006) (“As directors . . . the individual defendants owed
fiduciary duties to the Company.”); 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.16 (4th ed. Supp.
2021-22) (“[T]he duties of directors designated by large stockholders are clear: under Weinberger,
they still owe the corporation and its shareholders an uncompromising duty of loyalty.”); 1
EDWARD P. WELCH, ANDREW J. TUREZYN & ROBERT S. SAUNDERS, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.2.1.7 (5th ed. 2006) (“[T]he law does not recognize a special
duty on the part of directors elected by a special class to the class electing them. Rather, the law
demands directors’ fidelity toward the corporation and all of its stockholders.”).
106. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). Under this standard of
review, the board or shareholder bears the burden of proving the fair price and fair process of a
challenged transaction. Id.
107. Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., No. 9173, 1987 WL 16285, at *10 (Del. Ch. Aug.
27, 1987) (holding that there is no “special duty on the part of directors elected by a special class
to the class electing them”).
108. See Holdgreiwe v. Nostalgia Network, Inc., No. 12914, 1993 WL 144604, at *6 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 29, 1993) (“[Director] is already under an obligation to maintain the confidences of
[corporation]; to use its confidential information only to inform discussion among directors and
action by the board or a committee. Disclosure of such information to [shareholder] is a violation
of duty whether or not an undertaking is entered.”); E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di
Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency
Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 775 (2008) (“Constituency directors may breach their fiduciary duty
of loyalty by transmitting confidential corporate information to their sponsors despite any

VERSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

646

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/16/2021 10:21 AM

[Vol. 71:619

Although the precise boundaries of selective sharing are not clear,
three important takeaways are clear. First, selective disclosure to a
shareholder can violate an officer or director’s fiduciary duty if the
disclosure is not in the interests of the corporation.109 For example, a
director who shares corporate information with a friend in exchange
for a bribe would violate corporate norms just as much as if she shares
the corporation’s secret cola recipe in exchange for a bribe.
Second, nothing in that determination treats insider gifts
differently than insider trades. If it violates norms of equal treatment
to give a valuable trading opportunity to a single investor, it equally
violates those norms to confer a valuable donative opportunity. If it
harms a corporation to leak secrets to a trading shareholder, it likewise
violates a manager’s duties to share corporate information with a
shareholder intent upon a similarly harmful gift. The question, of
course, is whether and when gifts can be harmful to the corporation—
a question this Article takes up later.110
Third, informed gifts by shareholders are inherently more
suspicious than similar gifts by officers and directors. That is because
there is no question that officers and directors ought to have material
nonpublic information about the firms they run. Their jobs require that
information. For officers and directors, the only question is whether
they have misused the information by trading, gifting, or otherwise. By
contrast, any time a shareholder engages in a trade based on material
nonpublic information, it must be asked whether it was appropriate for
the shareholder to possess that information. There is nothing in a
shareholder’s role that requires them to be briefed on all nonpublic
matters, and it is quite often inappropriate for them to be so informed.
When courts find that insiders have shared information with
shareholders, who then make gifts, a serious examination is required
to see if that sharing was a breach of duty.111

contractual expectations to the contrary.”); Comm. on Corp. L., ABA Section of Bus. L.,
Corporate Director’s Guidebook, Fifth Edition, 62 BUS. LAW. 1479, 1500 (2007) [hereinafter
Corporate Director’s Guidebook] (“A director must keep confidential all matters involving the
corporation that have not been disclosed to the public.”).
109. In re Dole Food Co., No. 9079-VCL, 2015 WL 5052214, at *43 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015)
(holding that “a fiduciary sharing of information with an affiliated stockholder and its advisors,
standing alone, is not inherently a breach of duty” and that “[t]he use and sharing of information
is rather another context-dependent inquiry”).
110. Infra Part IV.B.1.
111. Infra notes 103–08 and accompanying text.
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B. Transaction Rules
Several bodies of law constrain a person’s ability to trade after
learning corporate secrets. Federal insider trading law attracts the most
attention; each year it leads to dozens of civil enforcement actions and
a handful of criminal convictions.112 Although the issue is not fully
resolved, it is likely that Rule 10b-5, the mainstay of insider trading
enforcement, applies to manipulative gifts. Less attention is given to
other legal authority constraining insider trading and manipulative
giving, such as federal wire fraud statutes and state corporate law,
which plainly could apply to gifts. The import is that insider giving is
often illegal, and it is false to say that there is no law against insider
giving, but that enforcement requires plaintiffs or the government to
reach for less familiar tools or seize upon less common facts, putting
manipulative giving in a privileged position.
1. The Short-Swing Profits Rule Does Not Constrain Insider
Giving. The short-swing profit prohibition of Section 16(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act” or “1934 Act”)
prohibits corporate insiders (defined as officers, directors, and
shareholders holding more than 10 percent of the company’s shares)
from making a profit by buying and selling (or selling and then buying)
their company’s stock within six months at a profit.113 Because 16(b) is
mechanically applied and not subject to the far more complicated
requirements of 10b-5, one might anticipate it to be an apt tool for
preventing manipulative gifting. But 16(b) is of no help, for it exempts
bona fide gifts to a charity.114 Thus, a trader who could not legally buy
shares at a low price and then sell them during a temporary spike can
buy shares and then gift them during a temporary spike without
violating 16(b). On this point of law, there is plainly less regulation of
gifts than sales. The same cannot be said of many other points discussed
below.

112. LOPUCKI & VERSTEIN, supra note 98, at 534.
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-5 (2020); accord Dreiling ex rel. Infospace, Inc. v. Kellett, 281 F.
Supp. 2d 1215, 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (holding acknowledges the law exempting charitable
gifts).

VERSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

648

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/16/2021 10:21 AM

[Vol. 71:619

2. Rule 10b-5 Prohibits Some Insider Giving. Section 10b of the
1934 Act115 and the corresponding SEC Rule 10b-5116 prohibit fraud “in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”117 Although
neither refers to insider trading, the viability of insider trading claims
based on those provisions has been confirmed by years of caselaw,118
administrative rulemaking,119 and statutory amendments.120 The
resulting doctrine is complex,121 and this Article will not rehash the
various theories and their subtle requirements. For present purposes,
the key question concerns whether 10b-5’s “purchase or sale”
requirement applies to insider gifts.122 The rule does not mention gifts,
so it is natural to think that Rule 10b-5 is not applicable if a shareholder
merely gives stock away.123 But the analysis is actually more
complicated.
One complication is that 10b-5 does not require that the sale itself
be the locus of all the elements of the fraud. The only requirement is
that the transaction be “in connection with” the sale of a security. As
long as a manipulative gift is “in connection with” a subsequent sale, a
10b-5 insider trading action should be available. This is significant
because stocks are not heirlooms, kept on the recipient’s mantle
forever: recipients of gifts tend to sell the stock.
This resale can happen for one of three reasons. First, the gift
recipient may be a foundation controlled by the giver. Many gifts of

115. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
116. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5 (2015).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
118. E.g., Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (allowing the
plaintiffs to bring complaints for insider trading practices based on Section 10b and Rule 10b-5);
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423 (2016) (same).
119. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243 & 249) (adopting new rules for the enforcement of insider
trading based on SEC Rule 10b-5).
120. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to
increase the sanctions against insider trading).
121. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of
Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429 (discussing the issues that have arisen from the
complex evolution of insider trading doctrine).
122. This analysis takes for granted a situation where an insider would be liable were the
transaction a sale in order to ask what the results for a gift would be.
123. See Portnoy v. Memorex Corp., 667 F.2d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that Rule
10b-5’s definition of “buy” and “sell” does not include gifts).
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stock are directed toward the giver’s own pet charity.124 Just as the
shareholder did not want to own stock while it drops in value, the
shareholder may want the charity to realize gains before bad news is
disclosed. Thus, an individual might misappropriate information or
inappropriately obtain it as a tippee, gift it to her pet charity, and then
cause the charity to promptly sell the stock. It seems plausible that
these facts satisfy the elements of 10b-5, because the insider giver is
also personally trading (albeit through a charitable entity). Indeed, the
selling charity would be in violation of 10b-5 for selling when its
decisionmaker has so acted, and with the decisionmaker derivatively
liable. Accordingly, in SEC v. Zomax,125 the SEC successfully brought
an insider trading action against two executives who sold stock (both
directly and through a trust they controlled) on the basis of material
nonpublic information that the company’s revenue and earnings would
be considerably lower than expected.126 The defendants settled the case
for more than $2 million.127
Second, the giver may tip the charity that it would be wise to
promptly sell the securities. On these facts, the charity is plausibly a
tippee, the recipient of a tip who has made no assurance of
confidentiality. A tippee is liable if she “knows or should know that
there has been a breach” by whichever insider shared the
information—whether it be her immediate source (the donating
shareholder) or someone higher up the chain.128 The charity has
become a “participa[nt] after the fact.”129 Tippees are usually only
liable if the tipper has received a personal benefit in exchange for their
tipping information, but given the expansiveness of the personal
benefit test, this element will often be present.130 Many charities confer
reputational benefits on their donors.131 Dirks v. SEC,132 the case that
introduces the insider trading law of tippers, explicitly identifies a
124. Yermack, supra note 12, at 123.
125. Zomax, Inc. et al., Exchange Act Release No. 19262, 85 SEC Docket 1875 (June 9, 2005).
126. Id. at 1885.
127. Litigation Release, SEC, SEC Files Insider Trading Charges Against Two of Zomax
Inc.’s Former Officers and Files Settled Financial Reporting Charges Against Zomax, Inc. and
Two of Its Officers (June 9, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19262.htm
[https://perma.cc/H9MT-WXPU].
128. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983).
129. WILLIAM WANG & MARC STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 401 (3d ed. 2010).
130. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 667.
131. Supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
132. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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reputational benefit as a sufficient personal benefit.133 And as already
seen, the tax benefits of manipulative gifts can sometimes be
substantial—potentially greater than making no gift at all.134
Accordingly, it is unsurprising that the SEC has successfully argued
that a donor’s tax benefit constitutes a personal benefit. In SEC v.
Buntrock,135 Waste Management’s CEO gave a gift of 100,000 shares
to his college alma mater days before the new management stated that
the previous year’s statements were inflated.136 The SEC alleged, and
was successful in arguing, that “[t]hrough the gift of inflated stock,
Buntrock was unjustly enriched in the form of the increased tax
benefit.”137
Third, even when the giver neither controls nor offers hints to the
charity, the charity is nevertheless likely to resell the securities—
prompt sale is considered a best practice138 and is widely undertaken.139
Indeed, many charities make it their official policy.140 Several reasons
support prompt sale. First, charities need cash to fulfill their

133. Id. at 663.
134. Supra Parts I.C.–D.
135. SEC v. Buntrock, No. 02-C-2180 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002).
136. Id. The case was settled with entry of an injunction against future violations of the
Exchange Act and disgorgement. SEC v. Buntrock, Exchange Act Release No. 19351 (Aug. 29,
2005), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19351.htm [https://perma.cc/ZD79-TTBZ].
137. Complaint at 132, SEC v. Buntrock, No. 02-C-2180 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002).
138. Receiving Gifts of Stock, CTR. FOR FAITH & GIVING (Jan. 21, 2016, 12:00 PM),
https://centerforfaithandgiving.org/2016/01/receiving-gifts-of-stock [https://perma.cc/BXP3MYHH] (“We recommend that you sell all stock gifts as soon as they are received . . . .”); Todd
Kimball, Accounting and Reporting for Stock Gift Donations to Nonprofits, CFO SELECTIONS
(Mar. 3, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.cfoselections.com/perspective/accounting-and-reportingfor-stock-gift-donations-to-nonprofits [https://perma.cc/F6FT-Q3SK] (“The best and most
commonly used practice is to sell all stock immediately upon receipt.”).
139. CHRISTOPHER R. HOYT, CV041 ALI-CLE 223, PLANNING FOR MAXIMUM TAX
BENEFITS FROM CHARITABLE GIFTS BY CORPORATIONS AND THEIR SHAREHOLDERS (2014)
(“Second, a large block of donated stock will usually not conform to the charity’s investment
policy. The charity will prefer to diversify and put the proceeds in its investment pool.”).
140. Briana Peters, How To Handle Stock Donations, HAWKINS ASH CPAS (Mar. 18, 2021),
https://hawkinsashcpas.com/how-to-handle-stock-donations [https://perma.cc/RR5S-59YZ]
(“Many organizations have a gift policy which requires that gifts of stock are liquidated upon
receipt to minimize the risk associated with the stock market.”); see also, e.g., Financial Donations,
HESED HOUSE, https://www.hesedhouse.org/financial-donations [https://perma.cc/S4KT-JUYV]
(“Upon receipt of the stock gift into our brokerage firm, it is Hesed House’s policy to immediately
sell the stock donation.”); Dickinson v. Comm’r, 120 T.C.M. (RIA) 2020-128 (2020) (explaining
that Fidelity “‘has a donor advised fund program which incorporates procedures requiring . . .
[Fidelity] to immediately liquidate the donated stock’ and ‘seeks an imminent exit strategy and,
therefore, promptly tenders the donated stock to the issuer for cash’” (alteration in original)).
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objectives.141 Second, charity managers are fiduciaries, bound to wisely
steward the money of their charity. That mandate is almost universally
understood to require diversification of the charity’s portfolio.142 The
receipt of a large quantity of a single issuer’s securities necessarily
requires a large sale to rebalance the portfolio.143 A final reason that
charities will sell is that they are not dumb. They understand that
donors tend to donate before troubling disclosures, not after.144 Some
academic research confirms that it is common wisdom for charities to
assume that the donor would advise them to sell if only they were
permitted to speak.145
If charities promptly sell the shares they receive, and if the reason
for the gift is itself nonpublic information about the company’s
prospects, insiders should typically understand that their gifts may
constitute tips, given with the expectation that the recipient will
trade.146 Indeed, the only time an insider would be reasonable to expect
the charity to retain the securities is when the insider controls the
charity and decides to let the charity hold the bag at the time of the
adverse disclosure.
So far, this Article has examined the ways that a straightforward
sale might be found in connection with the insider’s gift. But, securities

141. HOYT, supra note 139.
142. See UNIFORM PRUDENT MANAGEMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL FUNDS ACT § 3(e)(4)
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L.) (urging diversification); UNIFORM PRUDENT
INVESTOR ACT (UPIA) § 3 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L.) (urging same). But
see UNIFORM PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 4 cmt. (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L.)
(“No positive rule can be stated with respect to what constitutes a reasonable time for the sale or
exchange of securities.” (citation omitted)).
143. See Douglas Moore & Mitchell K. Higgins, Planning and Investing Strategies for Private
Foundations, 15 TAX’N EXEMPTS 156, 161 (2004); HOYT, supra note 139.
144. An interesting question is whether a given charity violates the law by trading while aware
that the donors tend to give in advance of negative disclosures. In many cases where a donor
would be liable as a tipper, the trading charity would be liable as a tippee. However, the details
of this analysis are beyond the scope of this Article’s focus on the conduct and liability of major
shareholders.
145. Valentina Salotti & Mark L. Power, Market Timing of Individuals’ Charitable
Donations to an Educational Foundation 7 n.2 (June 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (“Anecdotally, Foundation staff indicated that it was their position that stock donors had
more knowledge about the stock donated than the Foundation, implying that they thought the
stock was overvalued.”).
146. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 69 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that insider trading
occurs when an insider “‘disclos[es] inside information as a gift . . . with the expectation that [the
recipient] would trade’ on the basis of such information or otherwise exploit it for his pecuniary
gain” (alteration in original) (quoting Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016))).
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law generally adopts a radically more expansive definition of “sale”
than does ordinary English, thus permitting a second possible reason
to doubt the legal immunity of insider givers.147 The 1934 Act defines
“sale” broadly: “[t]he terms ‘sale’ and ‘sell’ each include any contract
to sell or otherwise dispose of [securities].”148 A person who gives
something away certainly disposes of it, which would make the insider’s
gift of securities to the charity itself a sale for the purposes of federal
insider trading law. Moreover, the use of the term “include” suggests
that the actual definition of the word “sale” goes beyond just these
enumerated items.149
Bona fide gifts of securities have generally not been deemed
“sales” for the purposes of federal antifraud law.150 However, courts
have held that gifts are sales “when the purpose of the ‘gift’ is to
advance the donor’s economic objectives rather than to make a gift for
simple reasons of generosity.”151 So, for example, where a “free” stock
distribution benefitted donors by attracting people to their website, the
“gift” was deemed a “sale.”152 And federal courts have often used the
gift analogy to illuminate core insider trading law issues. For example,
in Dirks, the Supreme Court announced its tipper-tippee jurisprudence
by reference to gifts—“The tip and trade resemble trading by the
insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”153 The
court reasoned that tipping is illegal because it resembles a sale
followed by a gift—so why not a gift followed by a sale?154 If sale and
147. See Iman Anabtawi, Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835, 879 (2004) (discussing
the expansive definition).
148. .15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(14) (emphasis added).
149. On inclusive and exclusive lists, see generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein,
Catalogs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 165 (2015).
150. See Shaw v. Dreyfus, 172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1949); see also In re Complete Mgmt.
Inc. Sec. Litig., 153 F. Supp. 2d 314, 328 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting in a footnote, without analysis
or citations, that one of the individual defendants in a securities fraud class action had “disposed
of her CMI shares by gift, and thus we do not consider that activity to be improper insider
trading”).
151. Universalscience.com, Inc., Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 7879, 2000 WL 1121540,
at *2 (Aug. 8, 2000).
152. Id.; see also Lawrence v. SEC, 398 F.2d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 1968) (stating that there is no
significant difference between the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act with respect to
the definition of “sale”). Carol J. Sulcoski, Note, Looking a Gift of Stock in the Mouth: Donative
Transfers and Rule 10b-5, 88 MICH. L. REV. 604, 619 (1989).
153. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
154. In United States v. Martoma, the Second Circuit recently revived this type of analysis:
Imagine that a corporate insider, instead of giving a cash end-of-year gift to his
doorman, gives a tip of inside information with instructions to trade on the information
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gift are like encouraging someone to sell, then giving to someone
expected to sell seems like a logical extension.
Skeptics of insider giving are right to say that gifts are not always
sales or in connection with sales, and so traditional 10b-5 insider
trading analysis is not always straightforward. But there are several
strong arguments for why many gifts on the basis of material nonpublic
information violate federal antifraud laws. Furthermore, it is a mistake
to assume that 10b-5 is the only relevant federal antifraud law. The next
Section discusses additional paths to liability.
3. Other Federal Law Prohibits Some Insider Giving. Although
10b-5 is the best known vehicle for an insider trading charge, other
federal laws support similar charges—without the troublesome
“purchase or sale” requirement. For example, the Department of
Justice can bring insider trading cases under the federal mail fraud155
and wire fraud statutes.156 This should come as no surprise. One of the
best known insider trading cases, Carpenter v. United States,157 was
prosecuted on this basis. There, a Wall Street Journal journalist leaked
market-moving information about futures columns and was convicted
of mail and wire fraud, not Rule 10b-5.158
In general, the requirements for mail and wire fraud are the
same,159 apart from the substrate (mails or wires) used: “(1) having
devised or intending to devise a scheme to defraud (or to perform
specified fraudulent acts), and (2) use of the mail for the purpose of
executing, or attempting to execute, the scheme (or specified
fraudulent acts).”160 However, convictions for wire and mail fraud for
insider trading are often easier for prosecutors to obtain than many
and consider the proceeds of the trade to be his end-of-year gift. In this example, there
may not be a “meaningfully close personal relationship” between the tipper and tippee,
yet this clearly is an illustration of prohibited insider trading, as the insider has given a
tip of valuable inside information in lieu of a cash gift and has thus personally
benefitted from the disclosure.
869 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2017).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
156. Id. § 1343.
157. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
158. Id. at 22, 24.
159. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 355 n.2 (2005) (“[W]e have construed
identical language in the wire and mail fraud statutes in pari materia.”); Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25
n.6 (“The mail and wire fraud statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly
we apply the same analysis to both sets of [insider trading/tipping] offenses here.”).
160. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 721 (1989).

VERSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

654

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/16/2021 10:21 AM

[Vol. 71:619

criminal actions under 10b-5.161 Importantly, there is no “purchase or
sale” requirement. No transaction of any kind is required, so it is
plainly no disqualification that a gift took place rather than a sale.162 To
the contrary, the mail and wire fraud statutes specifically note that gifts
stand on equal footing with sales. The statute bans fraudulent schemes
“to sell” or “give away” any security.163
Wire and mail fraud do require fraud or fraudulent scheme,
though those terms are expansive and can easily apply to an insider gift.
First, shareholders who implicitly promise confidentiality to their
manager-source have defrauded that immediate source.164
Shareholders who obtain the secret from a manager who breached a
duty to the issuer by sharing it have helped defraud the ultimate source
of exclusive use of the information and are liable as such. A wire or
mail fraud case in no way requires that the insiders profited from the

161. William K.S. Wang, Application of the Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes to Criminal
Liability for Stock Market Insider Trading and Tipping, 70 U. MIA. L. REV. 220, 256 (2015) (“Rule
10b-5 misappropriation is more difficult to prove than mail and wire fraud.”).
162. For those who would nevertheless like to find a sale, there is also ample precedent for
treating the downstream sale by the charity as part of the fraudulent scheme. Consider the facts
of Schmuck v. United States and how they might track onto an insider gift. 489 U.S. 705 (1989). In
that case, an individual (Schmuck) falsified odometers on cars and then sold them to dealers. Id.
at 707. The unknowing dealers then sold the cars to the public and mailed a title application with
mileage to the secretary of state. Id. The dealers did not commit fraud because they did not know
the mileage was false; Schmuck did not mail anything false. See id. at 707–08. But Schmuck caused
people to sell things in a context of error which, if the seller knew what she was doing, would have
been fraudulent. Schmuck’s conviction was upheld. Id. at 722. The U.S. Supreme Court likewise
noted that Schmuck’s scheme depended on the good will of his dealer-customers, which would
have faltered if the secretary of state or downstream customers learned the truth about the cars.
Id. at 714. An insider who gives stock to a charity, knowing the charity will then sell it, and that
the charity would violate federal antifraud law if it knew what the insider knows about the
security, would seem analogous. Also in parallel, the insider’s pattern of palming securities off
onto charities at the crest of the market will not be successful if downstream customers discover
that the securities were given with bad news in sight.
163. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
164. This is akin to the “misappropriation” theory of insider trading endorsed in United States
v. O’Hagan. 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997). It is also applicable to mail and wire fraud cases, as
evidenced by the fact that Carpenter v. United States is plainly a misappropriation case. 484 U.S.
19, 24 (1987).
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scheme.165 The scheme merely needs to violate a cognizable “property
right,” which a corporation’s exclusive use of information surely is.166
In addition, , Section 1348 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(“SOX”) also includes a second federal theory lacking a “purchase or
sale” requirement: criminal securities fraud.167 These provisions were
enacted by Congress to “provide prosecutors with a different—and
broader—enforcement mechanism to address securities fraud than
what had been previously provided.”168
To secure a conviction for insider trading under SOX, the
government needs to show only that the defendant acted with
fraudulent intent and attempted to execute or executed a scheme or
artifice to defraud, which had a nexus with a security.169 In United States
v. Mahaffy,170 the defendants argued that an indictment could not be
sustained because they did not intend to cause any economic loss to
any actual or putative shareholder of the securities in question.171
Rejecting that argument, the court explained that the statute “does not
restrict, or even contemplate, the status of the victim.”172 Therefore, it
was sufficient that “the defendants either benefitted, or attempted to
benefit, from trading in securities.”173 Thus, as the U.S. Supreme Court
held in United States v. O’Hagan,174 fraud is committed “in connection
with” a security when confidential information is misappropriated for
trading purposes.175

165. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 25–26. Carpenter was decided before a 1988 amendment intended
to expand the reach of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which was limited in 2010 in Skilling v. United
States, 561 U.S. 358, 408–09 (2010). The post-Skilling law is likely the same on this point as was
true in Carpenter. Wang, supra note 161, at 248.
166. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653, 655 n.6. Every opinion also affirmed this point on mail
fraud. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 680 (Thomas, J., and
Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. 18 U.S.C. § 1348. For an overview of the new provisions, see also HAROLD S.
BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, SARBANES-OXLEY ACT IN PERSPECTIVE § 10:2 (2020).
168. United States v. Hussain, 972 F.3d 1138, 1146 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v.
Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 36 (2d. Cir. 2019)).
169. United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05–CR–613, 2006 WL 2224518, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2,
2006).
170. United States v. Mahaffy, No. 05–CR–613, 2006 WL 2224518 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2006).
171. Id. at *12.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
175. Mahaffy, 2006 WL 2224518, at *12 (citing O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 678).
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These principles suggest that SOX, which was intended to be
broader in application than other securities fraud statutes, may well be
a promising avenue for prosecuting gift-related fraud. Section 1348(1)
does not require that the fraud be in connection with a purchase or sale.
Nor, as Mahaffy teaches, does it require that the victims be (actual or
prospective) shareholders. Thus, in the backdating scenario, where the
false report is plainly sufficient to meet the fraud requirement, all three
elements would be met (given that the defendant benefits from the
fraud by receiving a tax deduction). Similarly, in the insider
information and insider leakage scenarios, the misappropriation of
information could very well satisfy all three requirements, in light of
Mahaffy and O’Hagan.
4. State Corporate Law Prohibits Some Insider Giving. State
corporate law includes its own prohibition on insider trading,176 often
referred to as “Brophy” actions in reference to Delaware’s leading
case.177 These claims derive from the fiduciary duty of loyalty owed by
an officer, director, or controlling shareholder.178 The duty of loyalty
prohibits fiduciaries from misusing corporate assets for their own
benefit, whether in trading or otherwise.179 It is not necessary for a
successful Brophy claim that the plaintiff corporation incurred any
harm as a result of the trade; rather, Brophy permits corporations to
recover illicit gains, independent of loss.180 The core of such claims is
that “it is inequitable to permit the fiduciary to profit from using
confidential corporate information.”181 Given the breadth of the duty
of loyalty, and the fact that Brophy actions are keyed to the benefits
insiders enjoy from their use of corporate information, it is possible
176. See, e.g., Kahn v. Kolberg Kravis Roberts & Co., 23 A.3d 831, 838 (Del. 2011).
177. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5, 7–8 (Del. Ch. 1949). Other states embraced similar
precedents. See, e.g., Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910, 913 (N.Y. 1969).
178. Brophy, 70 A.2d at 7–8. In common law insider trading claims, stockholders are likely
to be treated as constructive insiders. See, e.g., Laster & Zeberkiewicz, supra note 102 (“Given
the affiliation between the blockholder director and the stockholder and the understanding that
information will flow from the blockholder director to the stockholder, the stockholder will be
treated as a constructive insider for the purpose of the common law limitations on insider
trading.”); Kahn, 23 A.3d at 837–38 (“[A]ctual harm to the corporation is not required for a
plaintiff to state a claim under Brophy. . . . As the court recognized in Brophy, it is inequitable to
permit the fiduciary to profit from using confidential corporate information. Even if the
corporation did not suffer actual harm, equity requires disgorgement of that profit.”).
179. Brophy, 70 A.2d at 7–8.
180. Laster & Zeberkiewicz, supra note 102.
181. Brophy, 70 A.2d at 8; Kahn, 23 A.3d at 838 (emphasis added).
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that a Brophy action could be brought against an insider who times a
stock gift to capitalize on material nonpublic information. Insider
givers capture benefits, in the form of tax deductions and reputation,
that they would not capture if they used corporate information solely
for its intended purpose.
Yet Brophy actions are unlikely to deter much insider giving. First,
these actions belong to the corporation.182 Shareholders cannot bring
these actions if the board (or a special committee thereof) is capable of
fairly considering the merits of potential litigation.183 Instead,
corporate management decides whether the corporation should sue.
Since managers of the company are the likely sources of information
to any lucky shareholder, it is unlikely that they will frequently wish to
unearth and litigate these indiscretions or sue the shareholders whose
influence was great enough to secure information. Second, litigants
may only bring these actions if they discover a violative gift. But
shareholder-plaintiffs do not get to deploy wire taps or confidential
agents the way that the Department of Justice does when pursuing a
federal antifraud case. Instead, gifts are subject to only weak and
delayed disclosures, with no accompanying information to document
the information sharing. It is accordingly unlikely that derivative
actions of this sort will blaze new trails.
Finally, the typical recovery in a Brophy action is disgorgement of
ill-gotten gains.184 There are indeed gains when an insider makes a
manipulative gift, but it will often be difficult to establish those gains
with any certainty. Consider the marginally higher tax benefit obtained
by giving at one point (the one supported by the inside information)
182. See Brophy, 70 A.2d at 7–8. As the Delaware Court of Chancery explained,
A Brophy claim is fundamentally derivative in nature, because it arises out of the
misuse of corporate property—that is, confidential information—by a fiduciary of the
corporation, for the benefit of the fiduciary and to the detriment of the corporation.
The claim essentially arises out of agency law, which holds that an agent may not
acquire a material benefit (other than from his principal) in connection with his
position as agent.
Latesco, L.P. v. Wayport, Inc., No. CIV.A. 4167-VCL, 2009 WL 2246793, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 24,
2009).
183. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927,
932 (Del. 1993); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 1981).
184. See Guttman v. Jen-Hsun Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 505 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Delaware law has
long held—see Brophy v. Cities Service, Inc.—that directors who misuse company information to
profit at the expense of innocent buyers of their stock should disgorge their profits. This doctrine
is not designed to punish inadvertence, but to police intentional misconduct.” (footnotes
omitted)); see also Richard A. Booth, Sense and Nonsense About Securities Litigation, 21 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 1, 19 n.47 (2018) (noting that the general rule under Brophy is that wrongdoers must
disgorge any gain from improperly using corporate secrets).
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relative to another (the moment the gift would otherwise have been
made). How does one determine the counterfactual moment of the
gift? And how does one prove that the alternative transaction would
have been a lower value gift? Perhaps the shareholder would have sold
the stock instead. Only in rare cases will the tax benefits of a well-timed
gift exceed the sale price of the stock. Shareholders will usually be able
to produce a baseline for comparison that presents their use of inside
information as a but-for cause of losses rather than gains. Only if courts
account for the altruistic and reputational gains enjoyed by donors—
those extra components that make a gift attractive relative to a sale
even when the sale is for slightly more money—can they find gains in
such cases. And such accounting is a challenge.
Despite the numerous challenges to a successful Brophy action for
insider giving, they are mostly about proof and litigation procedure.
Unlike securities law, which is arguably tied to specific “purchase or
sale” statutory language, state corporate law bars insider trading
through ever-changing fiduciary case law. Given the right facts, a court
would not be compelled to dismiss a Brophy action just because the
challenged transaction is a gift.
C. Reporting Rules
When insiders transact, they must document it. Section 16(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires new officers, directors,
and shareholders holding greater than 10 percent of the firm’s shares
to publicly file most of their transactions within two business days on a
Form 4.185 Thus, when a large shareholder sells even a single share, the
public knows about it right away.186 Some transactions are, however,
exempt from Form 4. Most notably, bona fide gifts may be omitted
from Form 4.187
Disclosure of stock gifts is required on Form 5,188 but that filing is
anything but timely. Form 5 is an insider’s annual report, due within 45
days of the end of a corporation’s fiscal year.189 It contains a summary
185. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 403, 116 Stat. 745.
186. While all sales require prompt disclosure, small purchases (those under $10,000) do not.
They can be reported on a Form 5, with the same delay as a gift.
187. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-5 (f)(1)(i) (2020) (exempting bona fide gifts from Section 16(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act).
188. See id. § 240.16a-3(f)(1)(i) (2020) (requiring disclosure of “[a]ll transactions during the
most recent fiscal year that were exempt from section 16(b) of the Act”).
189. Id. § 240.16a-3(a) (2020).
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of some of the transactions already reported on Form 4, as well as a
grab bag of transactions exempt from Form 4.190 An insider who makes
a gift of stock on the first day of an issuer’s fiscal year could wait 410
days to disclose that gift on a Form 5.
Not all insiders wait until their Form 5 filing to disclose their gift
of stock. Anything that can be lawfully reported on a Form 5 can be
disclosed on a Form 4 instead. But electing to disclose a gift on Form 4
does not oblige the insider to comply with Form 4’s ordinary timeliness
requirement. As long as the Form 4 reports the gift by the time a Form
5 would have been required, the filing is lawful.191 Thus, a March 6
Form 4 could contain stock sales from March 4 or 5 alongside stock
gifts stretching back many months.
Backdated gifts necessarily involve fraudulent filing of a Form 4
or 5. For example, if an insider decides on March 6 that it would have
been wise to give stock to a charity one month ago, on February 6, the
investor can easily file a Form 4 or 5 reflecting a February 6 transaction
date. That filing could take place on March 6 or many months later.
The practical ability to report gifts long after they occur makes it simple
to use gifts, rather than sales, to capitalize on backdating schemes.
Filing a fraudulent date is at the insider’s fingertips—she need only
write a different number, since there is no readily accessible public
record of when the transaction took place. The odds of detection
without an audit are accordingly small.192 The ease, however, does not
ameliorate the violation. A backdated filing violates federal securities
laws.
D. Valuation Rules
When donors claim a charitable deduction for their gift, they must
assign a value to the gift for the purposes of the deduction. The general
rule is that property should be deducted at its “fair market value” at

190. See Annual Statement of Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities (Form 5), SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form5.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA97-82JA]; Annual Statement of
Changes in Beneficial Ownership of Securities (Form 5) General Instructions, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/files/form5data%2C0.pdf [https://perma.cc/72TD-9CRN].
191. See Statement of Changes of Beneficial Ownership of Securities (Form 4), SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form4data.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TZV-WJ2G] (“Form 5
transactions to date may be included on this Form and subsequent Form 5 transactions may be
reported on a later Form 4 or Form 5, provided all transactions are reported by the required
date.”).
192. See supra Part I.D.4.
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the time of the gift.193 Treasury Regulations provide guidance for how
to determine that value.194 In general, gifts of liquid stocks are valued
at the midpoint of the highest and lowest trading prices of the day.195
Donors who backdate their gifts violate this requirement. The fair
market value of their gift is determined by the midpoint price on the
date their gift actually occurred; the midpoint on some other day,
selected precisely because it is a high price, is not the fair market
value.196
It may seem that well-timed gifts, which benefit from C-suite
access but not backdating, pose no valuation risks; the insider who
expects the stock to decline next week can lawfully donate stock today
because the fair market value today is defined by Treasury Regulations
to arise from today’s trading prices. On this view, there is no tax law
problem with using corporate influence to maximize deductions. Yet
this is mistaken. Gifts on the basis of material nonpublic information
can constitute illegal valuation abuse.
The starting point to see this is an attentive reading of 26 C.F.R. §
20.2031-2, which governs the valuation of gifted securities. It begins
with the governing rule, “The value of stocks and bonds is the fair
market value per share or bond on the applicable valuation date.”197 It
then states that “[i]n general” the midpoint of the high and low price
“is the fair market value,”198 but the rule never states that this measure
of fair market value is authoritative in all cases. To the contrary, the
introductory signal “[i]n general” indicates that some stocks will have
a midpoint price that is not the fair market value. If an insider claimed
a deduction for the midpoint price of stock in a case where that price
did not reflect fair market value, the insider will have misvalued the
gift.
This is not a mere textual possibility. There is widespread
acceptance of at least two classes of cases where the fair market value
of a gift is not its midpoint price. First, where a gift is given and then
promptly sold, many tax practitioners and scholars believe that the sale
193. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-2(a)–(b)(1) (2020).
194. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
196. 26 U.S.C. § 2512(a).
197. 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-2(a) (2020).
198. Id. § 20.2031-2(b) (2020) (“In general, if there is a market for stocks or bonds, on a stock
exchange, in an over-the-counter market, or otherwise, the mean between the highest and lowest
quoted selling prices on the valuation date is the fair market value per share or bond.”).
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price should be used to value the gift, even if it differs from the
midpoint price.199 Accordingly, when an insider donates stock to a
charity, and that charity holds the stock a short while and then sells the
stock after bad news is disclosed, the insider may commit valuation
fraud in claiming a deduction at the high midpoint price rather than the
low actual sale price.
Second, and more intriguingly, a recent advisory memo from the
IRS Chief Counsel endorsed the view that insiders’ material nonpublic
information about a stock can support a different fair value calculation
than the midpoint price.200 In that memo, a donor gave securities at a
time that a merger was pending but not disclosed.201 The price of the
securities rose a great deal once the merger was announced.202 The
taxpayer wished to claim a deduction for the high postannouncement

199. The reasoning for this view as to gift taxation involves recourse to analogy from the law
of estate taxation. Estate tax valuation authorities are generally applicable to income tax
valuation for charitable contributions of property. See Anselmo v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 872, 881
(1983), aff’d, 757 F.2d 1208 (11th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he test to be used for valuation for estate and
gift tax purposes is generally the same as that used for charitable contribution deduction
purposes.”); JOHN BOGDANSKI, FEDERAL TAX VALUATION ¶ 2.03 (2021). This is particularly
understandable, since the governing rules for estate and gift tax valuation are almost identical.
Compare 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-2 (2020) (giving the rules for gift tax valuation), with id. § 25.25122 (2020) (giving the rules for estate tax valuation). Given the analogy, tax practitioners note the
appropriateness of valuing stock gifts in light of an important Revenue Ruling directed toward
the estate tax valuation of stock gifts, sold by the recipient within one year of a decedent’s death.
Rev. Rul. 70-512, 1970-2 C.B. 192. This guidance requires executors to use the actual sale price—
rather than the midpoint method—to value the gift. Id. The reasoning is persuasive: “where the
stock or bond is itself sold to the public in an arm’s length business transaction . . . the actual
selling price is the best evidence of the fair market value per share or bond.” Id. The guidance
further states that, when this is the case, “resort to the valuation formulae set out in section
20.2031-2 [the midpoint calculation] of the regulations is neither necessary nor appropriate.” Id.
Accordingly, when living donors give stock, which is promptly sold, it is plausible that the sale
price is the best indicator of fair market value. See BOGDANSKI, supra note 199, ¶ 3.04. An IRS
guidance document further elaborates on this point:
Section 25.2512-2(e) provides, in relevant part, that in cases in which it is established
that the value per bond or share of any security determined on the basis of the selling
or bid and asked prices as provided under § 25.2512-2(b) does not represent the fair
market value thereof, then some reasonable modification of the value determined on
that basis or other relevant facts and elements of value shall be considered in
determining fair market value.
The value of property for Federal transfer tax purposes is a factual inquiry wherein the
trier of fact must weigh all relevant evidence and draw appropriate inferences to arrive
at the property’s fair market value.
I.R.S. Chief Counsel Advisory 201939002 (Sept. 27, 2019).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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price on the theory that the merger was already a certainty at the time
the gift took place. The stock was already worth a lot, even if the
midpoint price did not yet reflect it. The Advisory agreed with the
taxpayer, reasoning that
[t]he value of the property is the price at which such property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller . . . and both
having reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. . . . Moreover, a
hypothetical willing buyer is presumed to be “reasonably informed”
and “prudent” and to have asked the hypothetical willing seller for
information that is not publicly available.203

Thus, the true price of the stock is what the buyers would have been
willing to pay if they had asked the insider about the undisclosed
merger and received an answer.
Although that case was favorable to the taxpayer, its reasoning
ought to apply equally in cases where it is not helpful to the taxpayer.
If a willing buyer would pay very little for a security if apprised of the
seller’s knowledge about the stock, then the value of the security is very
low—regardless of what prices ignorant buyers and sellers currently
accept in the trading market. On this reasoning, when a donor claims
the apparent market price for a security, while knowing undisclosed
information indicating that will surely depress the price once disclosed,
the donor improperly deducts too much. Accordingly, insider gifts can
constitute valuation fraud even if nothing is backdated and only the
publicly reported price is claimed.
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Having set out the rationales that might motivate manipulative
gifts, the strategies donors might use to operationalize them, and the
relevant legal constraints (or lack thereof), this Article now turns to
the data. To what degree do large shareholders play manipulative
games with their gifts? This Part presents evidence and analysis
consistent with large shareholders frequently exploiting their access to
corporate management to give the perfect gift, with plenty of
backdating utilized as well.

203.

Id. (quoting Est. of Kollsman v. Comm’r, 113 T.C.M. (CCH) 1172 (2017)).
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A. The Data
The insider trading data come from the Thomson Reuters Insider
Filing Data Feed (1986 to 2020). Our sample includes U.S. common
stocks. The time period is from January 1986 through December 2020.
The final dataset has over 1,000 unique Committee on Uniform
Securities Identification Procedures (“CUSIP”) numbers and over
9,000 observations. Stock price, outstanding shares, and stock return
information were obtained from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (“CRSP”).204 CUSIP numbers, unique to each firm, were used
to match insider trading data from the Thomson Reuters dataset to
price and return information from the CRSP dataset.
The Insider Filing Database includes all trades reported to the
SEC Ownership Reporting System. The data contain all open market
gifts by beneficial owners (direct or indirect owners of more than 10
percent of any equity class of securities) of publicly traded firms. These
insiders are identified with relation codes SH and B. To focus on large
shareholders, we exclude all gifts by officers and directors, or any
insider with both officer and large shareholder titles. Gifts are
designated by the transaction code G. To ensure that insiders give gifts
instead of receiving them, all observations with an
acquisition/disposition code equal to A were eliminated. The final
sample is limited to firms for which stock return data are available in
CRSP. Hence, all gifts of private corporations’ stock are excluded.
Finally, to deal with potential misreports and incorrect outliers, we use
cleansed data from Thomson Reuters.205
The gift database also provides three dates associated with an
insider gift. The transaction date is the date of gift giving, when an
insider donates the shares. The report date is the date when an insider
gift transaction is made public by the SEC. The signature date is when
the reporting form is signed by the insider.206

204. The CRSP database is a subscription-only database that comes with a subscription to
the Wharton Research Database. See Wharton Research Data Services, WHARTON SCH. UNIV. OF
PA., https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu [https://perma.cc/E85T-TNDX].
205. Thomson Reuters uses various checks to ensure data quality and assigns codes based on
its filters. We use only cleansing codes H “High Quality” and R “Passes all Reasonableness
checks.”
206. Not all three of these dates are recorded for every gift transaction.

VERSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

664

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/16/2021 10:21 AM

[Vol. 71:619

B. Sample Characteristics
Table 2 shows the sample characteristics of the dataset. The
sample is large, comprehensive, and covers 1986 through 2020
inclusive. It includes all gifts of their own firms’ shares by all large
shareholders in all publicly listed firms. As shown in Table 2, the
overall sample contains gifts by shareholders in 1,655 unique firms. The
total number of gifts is 9,858. Given the comprehensive cross-sectional
and time-series nature of the dataset, this Article’s conclusions apply
to all gifts by large shareholders and are not sample-specific.
Table 2 also shows that the average gift size is about 215,000
shares. Gift size increases with the size of the firms. In small firms, the
average gift size is about 150,000 shares, and in large firms, about
580,000 shares. The total number of shares gifted is also large, equaling
about 2.1 billion shares. The average dollar value gifted per firm is
about $30 million, while the total dollar value of the gifts is about $50
billion.
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Table 2: Sample Characteristics of Common Stock Gifts by Large
Shareholders, 1986–2020

Number of firms

Large Shareholders’ Stock Gifts
SmallMid-cap LargeAll
cap
firms
cap firms
firms
firms
1,655
1,244
295
116

Number of gifts

6,891

1,806

1,161

9,858

145,780

243,453

581,181

214,952

1,004.57

439.68

674.75

2,119.00

11.1

39.3

208.70

29.98

Average gift size
(number of shares)
Total gifts by
shareholders
(million shares)
Average dollar
amount per firm
(millions of dollars)

Total dollar amount
(millions of dollars) 13,808.4 11,593.5 24,209.20 49,611.1

C. Measurement of Abnormal Returns
We compute abnormal returns by subtracting the return to the
equally weighted index of New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”),
American Stock Exchange (“AMEX”), and NASDAQ stocks from the
returns for the stocks gifted by insiders.207 This approach controls for
market movements and implicitly assumes that average beta or risk
exposure is one. Given that the sample contains over 1,000 firms, this
assumption is satisfied. Hence, abnormal return ARi,t for stock i and

207. Our approach here is the same as in Avci, Schipani & Seyhun, supra note 12, at 1152–
53. Using as the benchmark the total return to the value-weighted market portfolio instead of the
total return to the equally weighted market portfolio gives similar results. We prefer the equally
weighted returns because most (about 75 percent) of the firms in our sample are small firms. and
the equally weighted index of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms is a better match for small
firms.
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for each firm i and day t. 𝑅 is
day t is computed as 𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅 − 𝑅
the simple daily return on the stock i gifted by insiders on day t. 𝑅 is
the daily return to the equally weighted index of NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ stocks on day t. For each event date t, these returns are first
averaged across all gifting firms i to compute average abnormal
returns:

𝐴𝐴𝑅 =

1
𝑛

𝐴𝑅

The average abnormal returns are then cumulated across the event
dates as

𝐶𝐴𝑅 =

𝐴𝐴𝑅

These cumulative abnormal returns are then graphed to examine the
behavior of abnormal returns around gifting dates.
D. Empirical Findings
We now examine the evidence regarding insiders’ behavior
around gift-giving days. Figure 1 shows the pattern of abnormal returns
for the overall sample period from one year before (250 trading days)
to one year after the gift-giving date. Figure 1 suggests that the large
shareholders are either lucky, or they engage in timing games around
their gift giving. Stock prices rise about 6 percent abnormally relative
to the market index during the one year before executives gift their
stock. Hence, if the overall market was up, the gifted stocks rose 6
percent more than the market. If the overall market was down, the
gifted stocks fell 6 percent less than the market during this period.
Following the gifting date, stock prices fell abnormally by about 4
percent relative to the overall stock market. The average maximum
stock price occurs near the day of the gift.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Gift Days

Cumulative Abnormal returns around gifts
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The conclusion from Figure 1 is that large shareholders were able
to avoid up to a 4 percent decline in the value of their gifts by acting
when they did rather than any time during the year before or after.
Hence, by carefully timing their gifts, large shareholders are able to
increase the size of their gifts on average by 4 percent.208 Furthermore,
for their donations to tax-sheltered institutions, large shareholders are
able to take 4 percent larger tax deductions as well.209 These large,
abnormal returns cry out for an explanation. We consider several such
explanations below.
One possible explanation for the abnormal returns is that
shareholders may be very lucky in finding the highest stock price for
their gift giving. This could be nothing more than chance. To test this
hypothesis, we examine the statistical significance of the rising prices
followed by falling prices. We can reject that hypothesis at the 1
percent significance level, once the return horizon reaches 20 days or
beyond. Although chance can never be ruled out entirely, the patterns
in Figure 1 suggest more than chance.

208. It is likewise true that they increase the size of their gift by 3 percent relative to giving a
year prior. Large shareholders are neither too early nor too late.
209. In fact, the tax benefits may be more than 8 percent larger, as we discuss infra.

VERSTEIN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

668

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/16/2021 10:21 AM

[Vol. 71:619

A second possibility is that large shareholders are, as a class,
simply great at predicting future prices. Gifts would be just one facet
of their general aptitude for transacting shrewdly. This second
possibility can be rejected as at odds with the finance literature and our
own data. The finance literature consistently shows no evidence that
large stockholders generally possess material nonpublic information or
that their trades otherwise outperform the market.210
Our data reiterate that large shareholders generally are not
especially skillful traders. We reinvestigate large shareholders’
abnormal profits when they engaged in open market sales and
purchases from 1986 to 2020. This sample contains 417,309 open
market transactions. This evidence is shown in Figure 1.1.

210. See, e.g., Hollis A. Skaife, David Veenman & Daniel Wangerin, Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting and Managerial Rent Extraction: Evidence from the Profitability of Insider
Trading, 55 J. ACCT. & ECON. 91, 93, 101 (2013); Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and
Insiders’ Strategic Trade, 55 MGMT. SCI. 224, 233 (2009); Shijun Cheng, Venky Nagar & Madhav
V. Rajan, Insider Trades and Private Information: The Special Case of Delayed-Disclosure Trades,
20 REV. FIN. STUD. 1833, 1835, 1857 (2007); SEYHUN, INVESTMENT INTELLIGENCE, supra note
11, at 73; H. Nejat Seyhun, Insiders’ Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN.
ECON. 189, 210 (1986); Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. BUS. 410,
410–11 (1974).
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Abnormal returns around open market trades

Figure 1.1: Abnormal Returns Around Large Shareholders’ Open
Market Sales and Purchases
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Consistent with the literature, we find that large shareholders’
open market sales and purchases indeed show little or no material
nonpublic information. Large shareholders lose small amounts after
they sell shares (prices rise slightly for about 10 months and fall only
slightly after 10 months) and they lose again about 0.5 percent after
they purchase shares (prices fall slightly).211 Once again, this evidence
confirms that large shareholders do not typically utilize material
nonpublic information when they trade in their own firms, which
makes the stock price behavior around their gifts shown in Figure 1
even more unusual. As a class, large shareholders do not appear to be
skilled predictors of future prices, yet something is different about
shareholders who make large gifts. Their giving has a prescience that is
not present in ordinary trading, which is consistent with their belief that
gifts are a safer way to exploit access to management or utilize
backdating. These possibilities are considered next.

211. The only evidence of information occurs within 10 days of their purchases when stock
prices rose a modest 1.8 percent.
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E. Manipulative Explanations
If abnormally good timing of gifts is not the product of luck or
skill, it may be that large shareholders obtain and use inside
information to time their gifts, pressure executives to reshuffle
corporate disclosures, or backdate their gifts. All three possibilities are
consistent with the abnormal returns depicted in Figure 1. However,
further analysis lets us partially disaggregate the contribution of the
various manipulative strategies. We are able to determine that
backdating is not the major contributor to insiders’ apparent luck,
though it remains an important tool for manipulative givers. Rather,
most of the effect seems to come from access to management and from
information leakage in particular.
1. Access Is More Important Than Backdating. All three
manipulative strategies will result in donors giving away stock at higher
prices than a randomly chosen moment for the gift. But they exhibit
slightly different patterns in expressing their good results. Gifts
associated with backdating should precede a decline in stock price but
with a kink in the decline at the reporting date. A donor who decides
on February 14 to make and report a gift can look back over a period
of time and select an optimal date prior to February 14, but she cannot
pick a date after February 14.212 By that point, the form will have been
filed, and it will be too late to change. Thus, a February 14 filing that
reports a gift on December 14 should predict lower prices between
December 14 and February 14,213 but no prediction can be made about
February 15 and onward. If backdating occurs, one can expect prices
to fall sharply between the gift date and the reporting date, but
beginning on the reporting date, they should resume a random walk.
In other words, backdating predicts a sharp cliff in information content,
with all of the abnormal returns located prior to the reporting date.
By contrast, access strategies should present no kink where
information content suddenly drops to zero. Recall that access means
that the donor rushes a gift to precede a disappointing disclosure or
urges a disclosure to be delayed to accommodate a gift. Either way, bad
news should come after the gift and push down the price. But there

212. We select this date because gifts can be reported within 45 days of the end of the fiscal
year of the issuer. For an issuer whose calendar year is its fiscal year, February 14 would be the
last day to file gifts in the preceding year.
213. If, say, December 18 had a higher price than December 15, the donor would have
selected December 18 as the purported gift date.
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should not be any special cutoff date where that effect runs out. Some
donors will donate the day before bad news comes out; others will give
10 months before the bad news comes out. Perhaps the negative
abnormal returns would lessen over time, but there should be nothing
special about the reporting date. If a donor reports a February 15 gift
on February 15, knowing bad news will be disclosed shortly, one should
expect prices to fall after the reporting date. Thus, any abnormal
returns observed after the reporting date may represent access
strategies but likely not backdating.
This evidence is shown in Figure 2. Although stock prices are
relatively flat prior to the reporting date, they continue to decline
sharply after the insider reporting date. In fact, stock prices decline
abnormally by about 4.8 percent following the reporting date. (All
abnormal returns 40 days after the reporting date attain statistical
significance at the 1 percent level.) This evidence strongly suggests that
most of the information content of gifts comes from access, whether
through information leakage or the ability to influence the company’s
disclosure dates. This finding is consistent with the interpretation that
gift-giving large shareholders are different and much better connected
to the executives of the firm than are large shareholders in general,
because anyone can backdate, but not everyone has access to
management.214

214. It may seem that abnormal returns could have the non-nefarious explanation that
individuals are simply more likely to give when stocks have increased in price; this could explain
why prices rise before a gift. However, this explanation would not predict prices to fall subsequent
to the gift. Insiders should not be able to identify “maximum” abnormal stock prices by simply
conditioning their giving on prior positive stock returns. The fact that insiders do identify the peak
price, and prices fall after the gift, suggests some degree of access to management.
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Figure 2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Large
Shareholders’ Gifts, Following the Reporting Date of Gifts

2. Information Leakage to Shareholders Is Probably More
Important Than Shareholders Influencing the Timing of Disclosures.
The evidence shown in Figures 1 and 2 is consistent with both access
strategies of executives leaking information to large shareholders or
altering disclosure dates to suit shareholders. It is difficult to tell
whether a gift was accelerated to precede bad news (gun-jumping) or
bad news was delayed to follow a gift (bullet dodging), since one cannot
observe the counterfactual. It is likewise difficult to tell whether a gift
was delayed to follow good news (waiting game) or good news was
delayed to follow a gift (bullet dodging). There is no record of when a
gift or disclosure would otherwise have been made.
Nevertheless, the data allow some insight into the nature of the
access exploited, and that evidence tends to suggest that information
leakage plays a more important role than influencing disclosure timing.
As with the prior discussion comparing access to backdating, we first
carefully consider the precise effects of these strategies and then test
for the presence or absence of those effects. Although both access
strategies lead to well-timed gifts, they do so in subtly different ways.
Crucially, gun-jumping has a distinctive effect not matched by any of
the other strategies: it is associated with normal returns before the gift
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and negative abnormal returns after the gift. To see this, consider the
effects each strategy should have on abnormal returns.
Where an informed donor delays a gift to follow disclosure of good
news (waiting game), one should expect positive abnormal returns in
the pre-gift period. If there is a gift, it is likely that good news was just
disclosed. However, there should be no positive or negative abnormal
returns in the postgift period; having had a good month does not ensure
or prevent the occurrence of bad news.
The same effect is predicted where good news is rushed forward
to increase the value of a gift planned to follow (spring loading). There,
one should expect positive abnormal returns in the pregift period. If
there is a gift, there is a good chance that good news was just disclosed,
but the postgift period should not be uncommonly fortunate or
unfortunate.
Where an informed donor rushes a gift forward to precede bad
news (gun-jumping), to which she is privy, no predictions can be made
about the pregift abnormal returns: bad news arises after good months
and bad months alike. But one can confidently predict the postgift
period—it will experience negative abnormal returns, because bad
news is going to be disclosed.
Finally, when bad news is delayed so that a planned gift can be
made at a better price (bullet dodging), two effects should follow. First,
the decision to quash bad news for a while should make for an
unusually cheery period prior to the gift, and so pregift abnormal
returns should be positive. Then, reality will set in when the delayed
bad news is finally disclosed. Sometime after the gift, the deferred
disclosures will be made, and abnormal returns should turn negative.
Thus, delaying bad news has two predicted effects, rather than one.
Table 3 summarizes these predictions.
Table 3: Predicted Abnormal Returns
Accelerate Gift (gun-jumping)

Negative postgift

Delay Gift (waiting game)

Positive pregift

Accelerate Disclosure (spring
loading)

Positive pregift

Delay Disclosure (bullet dodging)

Positive pregift and negative
postgift
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With these effects in mind, we can then divide up our sample of
firms with lucky donors to two sub-samples, based on their prior 30day abnormal price movements. If abnormal returns are positive in the
month prior to a gift, the price is labeled “up.” If 30-day abnormal
returns are negative, that price is labeled “down.” This subdivision
isolates the various forces leading to different outcomes.
Firms in the “up” subsample are more likely to have been subject
to bullet dodging and springloading than firms in the “down”
subsample. That is because both bullet dodging and springloading push
up positive abnormal returns in the pregift period. Firms in the “down”
sample are thus, on average, subject to less of both forms of disclosure
influence. But if they are subject to less bullet dodging, they should
exhibit less pronounced postgift negative abnormal returns. That is
because bullet dodging is the only influence strategy that produces
negative abnormal returns. If the “down” sample exhibits postgift
negative abnormal returns on par with the “up” sample, it will be an
indication that some amount of information leakage is occurring. Gunjumping, which means accelerating a gift to precede bad news, is
capable of producing postgift negative abnormal returns even when
pregift returns are not significantly positive. Put another way, two
strategies produce negative postgift abnormal returns, one based on
information and the other based on disclosure influence. The “down”
group is subject to relatively less disclosure influence than the “up”
group. Thus, if the “down” group displays comparable postgift
declines, it will indicate that information strategies must loom large.
Even most generally, if pregift returns predict postgift returns, it
will tend to confirm that influence strategies are being used because
influence strategies inherently affect both pre- and postgift returns. If
there is no predictive effect, and postgift returns bear no special
relationship to pregift returns, it will rule out influence as the exclusive
channel of manipulative giving for the same reason. These findings are
shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Abnormal Returns Around Gift Days, By Prior 30-Day
Stock Price Movements
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Figure 3 shows that prior price moves do not affect or explain the
general patterns of postgift day abnormal price movements. When
prices rise abnormally during the 30 days prior to the gift giving date,
prices still fall by 4.3 percent abnormally during the postgift period.
When prices fall during the 30 days prior to the gift giving date, prices
continue to fall by an additional 3.7 percent abnormally during the
postgift period. The difference between “up” and “down” groups is not
statistically significant. These results suggest that influence is not of
primary importance. The “up” firms’ pregift positive abnormal returns
would suggest more influence, but their approximately equal negative
abnormal returns after the gift are at odds with that prediction.
Recall that bullet dodging should be less common among the
“down” firms than the “up” firms. For that reason, greater price
declines among the “up” firms should be expected. But in fact, we find
the opposite. That positive prior abnormal returns are followed by
smaller postgift giving negative returns is also inconsistent with bullet
dodging as the main explanation.215
215. We can likewise strenuously reject the notion that spring loading, which means
accelerating good news, is the primary mechanism for manipulative giving, since spring loading
does not predict postgift negative abnormal returns—but both samples exhibit it.
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The net result is that information leakage seems to play a vital role
in explaining the apparent good luck of large shareholder donors.
Influence over disclosure schedules may or may not also play an
important role.
3. The Nature of Backdating. Although the data suggest that
information leakage predominates over backdating, they are still
consistent with backdating having a substantial effect. Accordingly,
further investigation of that manipulative strategy is warranted.
The backdating hypothesis suggests that holding all else constant,
if large shareholders backdate their gifts, then these gifts will
necessarily appear to be reported with delays, even if in reality they are
reported as soon as they are given. This is because when shareholders
backdate their gifts, they are designating a date earlier than the actual
date for reporting purposes in order to take advantage of a higher stock
price earlier in time for the charitable deduction. Lengthier reporting
delays give shareholders the ability to search further back in time for
the date with a higher stock price for reporting purposes. Backdating
should lead to an inverse-V-pattern, with prices lower on the days both
before and after the gift, and this inverse-V should be more
pronounced with a greater reporting delay, since it lets the donor select
the tallest mountain to climb.
These implications are tested next. The evidence is shown in
Figure 4, and it is consistent with backdating. It indicates that there is
a strong relation between reporting lags and the inverse-V-shaped
stock price patterns. In the promptly reported group (two days or
less),216 stock prices rise about 4.4 percent during the one year prior to
the gift date, and they continue to rise by about 3.2 percent during the
one year after gifting. Hence, there is no inverse-V-shape pattern for
gifts reported immediately. For those gifts that are reported with
between a three and 20-day delay, stock prices rise about 5 percent
prior to the gift date, and they decline about 5 percent during the one
year after gifting. Thus, there is an inverse-V-shape for this group.

216. We treat a gift as “promptly” reported if it is simply reported within two days throughout
the sample period. Prior to SOX, legally promptly reported stock sales had to be within 10 days
of the month following the trade date. Post-SOX, all sales must be reported within two business
days to be considered legally prompt. By characterizing a gift as “late or nonprompt” we are not
characterizing it as unlawfully late—given the lax reporting requirements for gifts, unlawfully late
gifts should be rare indeed. Rather, we are assuming that the reporting norms for sales set a
baseline of timeliness, and that it is noteworthy if a transaction departs from that baseline (even
if subject to a lawful exemption).
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Finally, Figure 4 also shows gifts that are reported with more than a 20day delay. For these gifts, stock prices rise about 6.5 percent prior to
the gift date, and they decline about 5.5 percent during the one year
after gifting. Hence, both the V-shape as well as postgift declines are
most pronounced for gifts that are reported with the greatest delays.
This evidence is consistent with backdating.
Figure 4: Abnormal Returns Around Gift Days, By Reporting
Lags
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Thus, the evidence is broadly consistent with the backdating
hypothesis. One caveat is that the stock option award backdating
scandal broke around March 2006,217 and many companies and

217. See Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2006,
11:59 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114265075068802118 [https://perma.cc/37UB-NFVE].
Reporting at the time recounted the situation as follows:
Suspecting such patterns aren’t due to chance, the Securities and Exchange
Commission is examining whether some option grants carry favorable grant dates for
a different reason: They were backdated. . . . The analysis bolsters recent academic
work suggesting that backdating was widespread, particularly from the start of the techstock boom in the 1990s through the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate reform act of 2002. If
so, it was another way some executives enriched themselves during the boom at
shareholders’ expense. And because options grants are long-lived, some executives
holding backdated grants from the late 1990s could still profit from them today.
Id.
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executives found themselves in litigation as a result.218 Consequently,
we would not expect much gift backdating in the immediate aftermath
of the scandal. To address this issue, we excluded the 10-year period
from January 1, 2006 to January 1, 2016 to better gauge the incidence
of potential backdating of gifts.219 This evidence is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Abnormal Returns Around Gift Giving Days, By
Reporting Lags, Excludes 1/1/2006 to 1/1/2016

Having set aside the period in which people would have been
unusually reluctant to backdate, the evidence of backdating grows
stronger. Once again, during this period, promptly reported gifts
(reported within two days or less) do not exhibit any abnormal price
patterns immediately around the gift-giving date. Prices also do not fall
appreciably (especially in the first six months) following the gift date.
For the middle group (between three and 20 days to report), prices rise
abnormally during the one year prior to the gift date by 4.8 percent and
218. See Spotlight on Stock Options Backdating, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/
optionsbackdating.htm [https://perma.cc/P9E6-AM37] (compiling enforcement actions against
companies related to options backdating).
219. We have also experimented with excluding five-year periods starting on January 1, 2005
and January 1, 2006 as well as a four-year period from January 1, 2006. These results are
qualitatively the same, and they are not shown separately. In all cases, excluding the scandal
period increases the information content of the gifts.
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fall by 8.2 percent during the one year following the gift date. For the
large delay group (more than 20 days to report), prices rise about 4.8
percent during the one year prior to the gift date and fall by 7.5 percent
during the one year following the gift date. Once again, the large delay
group shows the greatest patterns consistent with backdating.
We next examine the relation between gift size and abnormal
price patterns.220 Backdating increases the relative size of a tax benefit,
so it is more attractive when the gifts and corresponding tax deductions
are already large. If insiders deliberately manipulate gift reporting,
there should be a positive relation between gift size and abnormal price
patterns, with steeper stock price declines following larger gifts. The
evidence is shown in Figure 6. Consistent with the backdating theory,
the largest gifts show the steepest declines after the gift date.
Figure 6: Abnormal Returns Around Gift Giving Days, By Size

For gifts less than $10,000, there is an inverse-V-shape and the
stock prices decline abnormally about 4 percent during the one year
after gifting. For gifts between $10,000 and $1 million, there is no
inverse-V-pattern, and there is no postgift decline. Finally, for gifts
220. By “gift size” we mean “dollar volume.” Dollar volume of the gift is measured as the
product of the price and number of shares reported by the insiders. If a price is not reported or it
is reported as zero, we used the last closing stock price prior to the gift month.
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exceeding $1 million, there is a strong inverse-V-pattern. Stock prices
rise more than 15 percent prior to the gift date, and they decline about
9.1 percent during the one year after gifting. Hence, as expected, the
strongest V-shape and the biggest decline occur in the largest gift size
group. Larger effects for larger gifts are consistent with backdating.221
IV. MANIPULATIVE GIVING POLICY
The evidence shows that manipulative giving appears to be
widespread, and manipulative givers are unlikely to be detected or
punished, even if it is illegal. The next question is whether manipulative
giving is good or bad. Despite the name, some may be tempted to
defend manipulative giving. After all, it is giving. If some manipulative
games are necessary to drive charitable contributions, so be it.
Moreover, many of the problems with insider trading may seem
inapplicable to insider giving: it is not like top executives will smuggle
corporate secrets all day to large shareholders hungry to deplete their
fortunes with altruism.
This Part addresses the erroneous notion that gifts are inherently
harmless. To the contrary, it often pays to be skeptical of strangers
bearing gifts.222 Section A addresses tax policy on charitable giving,
setting out tax law’s goals in permitting charitable deductions and how
manipulative giving undermines it. Section B then turns to insider
trading policy, reviewing the ways in which scholars have faulted
insider trading and justified its regulation and showing how those same
policy considerations apply to insider giving.
A. Tax Policy
It is natural to defend insider giving as giving. Whatever mischief
insiders may be up to in pursuit of tax breaks, the tax breaks exist to
encourage wealthy people to give to charities, a goal vindicated by the
many thousands of stock gifts by insiders each year. But this
misunderstands the policies at stake in charitable giving.
The deduction for charitable giving is best viewed as a form of tax
expenditure, which is to say a form of government spending
221. That smaller dollar gifts also show some strategic timing suggests that insiders who are
worried about regulatory implications might be breaking up their large gifts into smaller units.
222. VIRGIL, AENEID II, at l. 49 (H.R. Fairclough trans., G.P. Goold rev., Harvard Press
2001) (29–19 B.C.) (“equo ne credite, Teucri. quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentis.”
(“Men of Troy, trust not the horse. Whatever it be, I fear the Greeks, even when bringing gifts.”)).
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administered through the tax code.223 Governments often style
spending programs as mere tax reductions: for example, a tax credit for
solar panels is effectively a government program that pays people to
install solar panels. The goal of these programs is to alter private
behavior. On this account, tax incentives are used to spur private
donations to charities, because charities tend to serve the public
welfare.224 One reason to encourage taxpayers to give to charities,
rather than have the government give directly, is that taxpayers may
sometimes give more wisely than governments.225 A second reason is
governments may get more value for their dollar this way, as a small
tax deduction may encourage large amounts of charitable giving.226

223. The other theory is that charitable deductions are necessary to preserve the natural level
of charitable giving, rather than letting it be dampened by the distortions of high income taxes.
Roger Colinvaux, Charitable Contributions of Property: A Broken System Reimagined, 50 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 263, 267–68 (2013) (explaining the “base-defining” account as “simply as a necessary
adjustment to properly measure income . . . . Under this approach, the tax base is defined to
exclude charitable giving expenses, which are seen as unlike other forms of private
consumption”). Congress discussed such an argument in its report on the matter:
The congressional intent behind the charitable deduction was to ensure taxpayers
would have money available to support charities, despite the necessary tax increase to
fund World War I . . . . “[T]he exemption from taxation of money or property devoted
to charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the Government is
compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden which would
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare.”
Kristin Balding Gutting, Relighting the Charitable Deduction: A Proposed Public Benefit
Exception, 12 FLA. TAX REV. 453, 460–61 (2012) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 75-1860, at 19 (1938),
reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. 728, 742).
224. E. C. Lashbrooke, Jr., Internal Revenue Code Section 170 and the Great Corporate
Giveaway, 22 PAC. L.J. 221, 228–29 (1991).
225. Professor David Schizer offers three separate rationales—all rooted in problems of
information and incentives—for why we should pursue public goals with subsidized charity rather
than other available policy instruments: “first, to encourage donors to be more generous; second,
to measure and reflect popular preferences about which public goals to pursue; and third, to
recruit private monitors.” David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives,
Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. REV. 221, 267 (2009); see also
Linda Sugin, Competitive Philanthropy: Charitable Naming Rights, Inequality, and Social Norms,
79 OHIO ST. L.J. 121, 124 (2018) (“[P]rivate funding of those public purposes relieves burdens on
government, fosters socially beneficial experimentation, and challenges government
orthodoxy.”).
226. See Martin Feldstein & Amy Taylor, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions, 44
ECONOMETRICA 1201, 1201 (1976); William C. Randolph, Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes,
and the Timing of Charitable Contributions, 103 J. POL. ECON. 709, 710 (1995); Laura Tiehen, Tax
Policy and Charitable Contributions of Money, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 707, 707 (2001) (estimating price
and income elasticities of charitable giving); Brian Galle, How Do Nonprofit Firms Respond to
Tax Policy?, 45 PUB. FIN. REV. 364, 364 (2016); see also John List, The Market for Charitable
Giving, 25 J. ECON. PERSPS., 157, 173 (2011). List also finds empirical evidence for the notion that
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Subsidizing charity through deductions presents a tradeoff:
“When policymakers consider giving tax breaks for charitable gifts,
they are at least implicitly considering the issue of whether the
marginal cost (foregone tax revenues) is less than the marginal benefit
(increased dollars of giving).”227 An “equitable statutory scheme” for
charitable contributions “encourages charitable giving but prevents tax
abuse.”228 Generally, “as the charitable deduction is constructed, the
government should not lose more revenue than a maximum percentage
(currently somewhere between thirty and forty-five percent) of the
amount that actually benefits a charity.”229

matching gifts increases the amount of charitable donations in the first place. See generally Dean
Karlan & John List, Does Price Matter in Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural
Field Experiment, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 1174 (2007) (finding “that simply announcing that match
money is available considerably increases the revenue per solicitation—by 19 percent”); Stephan
Meier & Bruno S. Frey, Matching Donations: Subsidizing Charitable Giving in a Field Experiment
(U. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 181, 2004) (finding that “matching donations increases the
contributions to a public good,” but “the effect depends . . . on the amount of the matching
mechanism”). Interestingly, one study found that matching contributions produced significantly
larger contributions than rebate mechanisms. See Catherine Eckel & Philip Grossman, Rebate
Versus Matching: Does How We Subsidize Charitable Contributions Matter?, 87 J. PUB. ECON.
681, 681 (2003); see also Harvey P. Dale & Roger Colinvaux, The Charitable Contributions
Deduction: Federal Tax Rules, 68 TAX L. 331, 360 (2015); Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of
Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the Social Construction
of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 89 (1994) (“The tax expenditure theory identifies this lost
revenue as an indirect federal subsidy to the charitable recipient administered through the
Internal Revenue Code. Since 1974 tax expenditures have been reflected in the federal budget.”);
Arthur C. Brooks, Income Tax Policy and Charitable Giving, 26 J. POL. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 599,
599 (2007) (“Favorable income tax treatment of charitable contributions comes from the policy
assumption that this will create an incentive to support what is arguably a public good or service,
or at least curtail the disincentive to give created by the income tax’s impact on disposable
income.”). On the other hand, Professor Gerald Auten and colleagues argue that transitory
income and tax effects have no impact on gift-giving behavior—what matters are the persistent
tax and income effects. Since tax policies have long-lasting effects on company income levels, they
are the most important elements determining the amount and timing of donations. Entities adjust
donations based on tax regulation more often than on income shocks. See Gerald E. Auten,
Holger Sieg & Charles T. Clotfelter, Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel
Data, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 371, 372 (2002) (discussing empirical data on charitable giving with
special emphasis on the effects of taxes).
227. List, supra note 226, at 170.
228. Vada Waters Lindsey, The Charitable Contribution Deduction: A Historical Review and
a Look to the Future, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1056, 1058 (2002); see also Colinvaux, supra note 223, at
264 (“[T]he broader policy for all charitable contributions should be . . . to encourage (or at least
not tax) gifts of measurable benefit to charitable organizations.”).
229. Gerzog, supra note 51, at 1179; see also Colinvaux, supra note 223, at 273 (citing S. REP.
NO. 91-552, at 80–81 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2109–10).
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As a whole, the policy rationale for charitable gift deductions is to
encourage taxpayers to give much more than the fiscal losses
(otherwise, the government could give to the charity directly) and to
encourage taxpayers to use their private information to select and
monitor reputable charities. Manipulative gifts generally frustrate
these goals and, therefore, undermine sound policy.
In several variations of insider giving, insiders take a tax deduction
that exceeds the value of the gift they give. Taxpayers who backdate
gifts always claim a higher tax valuation than the charity actually
received. Taxpayers who give just before bad news is disclosed are like
those who deduct a high value for a donated car despite knowing the
doors will soon come unglued and fall off. We observed in the
hypothetical variations of the case study of JetBlue, discussed above,
that this strategy can sometimes leave the donor wealthier than if she
never made a gift. It is bad tax policy for a taxpayer to give $1,000 to a
charity but receive more than $1,000 in tax benefits for so doing. This
is simply a form of valuation abuse.230
In other variations of the scheme, the charity receives an amount
equal to what the donor gave. That is when (1) the donor instructs the
charity to promptly sell, before bad news is disclosed, or (2) when a
preplanned gift is delayed after a favorable disclosure. These variants
only weakly frustrate tax policy: by encouraging taxpayers to wait to
give gifts, charities face longer periods before gifts are given. The first
offends no tax principles, though both pose problems under insider
trading policy, as the next Section explains.
B. Insider Trading and Giving Policy
An extensive literature discusses insider trading’s morality and
efficiency. Examining the various policy rationales reveals that they
operate substantially similarly for insider giving. Broadly speaking,
critics of insider trading (and thus, defenders of its legal prohibition)
identify three classes of harms implicated by insider trading: (1) harms
to the corporate issuer, whose information is used for trades; (2) harms
to retail traders and investors who lack inside information; and (3)
harms to the market. Each policy consideration is hotly contested, and
this Article does not purport to settle those debates—only to note the
plausible harms frequently alleged and their applicability to insider
gifts.

230.

Supra Part I.B.
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1. Harms to the Corporate Issuer. Scholars expect several
problems when insider trading is permitted at a corporation. First,
trading may distract employees by diverting their attention to trading
opportunities rather than business opportunities.231 These employees
might cause the corporation to take excessively risky actions. Each
surprising success or failure gives the employee a chance to trade
before the results of their actions are made public.232 Indeed, executives
might affirmatively sabotage business results, so that they can sell stock
shortly ahead of the unexpectedly bad results.233 They also might
manipulate disclosures, delaying or accelerating them to correspond to
their trading strategies.234
Moreover, the act of trading might lead to disclosure of an
employer’s proprietary secrets.235 For example, in the fall of 1963,
Texas Gulf Sulphur found “[t]he biggest ore strike since gold was
discovered” in Timmins, Ontario.236 Keeping the discovery secret for
231. James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the “Chicago
School”, 1986 DUKE L.J. 628, 646.
232. Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 332; Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets:
Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 149 (1982) (“[T]he temptation of
profit might actually encourage an insider to act against the corporation’s interest.”). But see
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857,
874–76 (1983) (arguing that risk-averse managers need such incentives, and their team dynamics
limit how far things can go without a leak).
233. This is the counterpoint to Manne’s idea that insider trading was a prudent way to
compensate employees for causing hard-to-compensate improvements in the business. HENRY G.
MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 138 (1966).
234. See Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the
Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1051, 1054–55 (1982) (“Subordinates would stall the upward
flow of critical information to maximize their opportunities for financial gain.”); Roy A.
Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA.
L. REV. 1425, 1437 (1967); cf. Jesse M. Fried, Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with
Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 421, 425 n.18 (2000) (“The prospect of insider
trading profits can . . . encourage insiders to invest in projects that are difficult for outsiders to
assess, whether these projects are otherwise desirable or not, in order to increase the information
asymmetry between themselves and public shareholders . . . .”). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Insider Trading, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 772, 787–88 (Boudewijn
Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000) (arguing that delay is unlikely).
235. See James D. Cox, Seeking an Objective for Regulating Insider Trading Through Texas
Gulf Sulphur, 71 SMU L. REV. 697, 707 (2018). For example, when mining executives buy their
company’s shares en masse, it may hint to other prospectors where they should dig to find
valuable minerals. Andrew Verstein, Insider Trading in Commodities, 107 VA. L. REV. 447, 490–
91 (2016).
236. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 843, 878 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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years, “Texas Gulf did what any prudent mining company would have
done to acquire property in which it knew a very promising anomaly
lay.”237 But the secret would not be kept. Texas Gulf insiders bought
their company’s stock to such a degree that it attracted media
attention.238 Texas Gulf Sulphur was forced to prematurely admit to its
discovery,239 giving landowners the chance to charge more and
competitors the chance to bid for morsels of the hoard.
Just as insider trading may tip off competitors to the detriment of
the corporation, the same leakage can occur if insiders share
information with friends and patrons. In Texas Gulf Sulphur’s case,
corporate insiders were not the only ones who bought stock on the
basis of the mineral find—many of the insiders’ friends and family (and
then their friends and family) bought stock in a daisy chain of
sharing.240 Even if the Texas Gulf fiduciaries had never traded, tips to
outsiders could have resulted in the same telltale trading that hinted at
a bonanza. Worse yet, the tips themselves (“We have found gold in
Timmins”) could somehow find their way to a competitor, who would
then have no need to decode the price signal.
The Corporate Director’s Guidebook explains a third harm risked
by insider trading, beginning with the risk from tipping to third parties:
“[U]nauthorized disclosure of nonpublic information by directors can
damage the bond of trust between and among directors and
management, discourage candid discussions, and jeopardize
boardroom effectiveness and director collaboration.”241 The
Guidebook correctly notes that directors may be less trusting and open
if they suspect that some members are squirreling away information for
friends and family. Directors who are more concerned with protecting
the corporation may attempt to exclude the less faithful ones from
information, creating a distrustful and hostile atmosphere unconducive
to collegial, strategic planning. Presumably, that effect would be only

237. Alan M. Weinberger, Forever Young: Texas Gulf Sulphur Rules at Fifty, 45 SEC. REG.
L.J. 23, 29 (2017) (quoting Leitch GoldMines, Ltd. v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., [1969] 1 O.R. 469
(Can. Ont. 1969)). See generally MORTON SHULMAN, THE BILLION DOLLAR WINDFALL (1969)
(describing U.S. litigation concerning land purchases settled out of court).
238. See Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 846–47.
239. Id.
240. See Keith Bishop & Allen Matkins, A Hollow Nickel, Hollywood And Texas Gulf
Sulphur, JD SUPRA (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/a-hollow-nickelhollywood-and-texas-77851 [https://perma.cc/BG5A-3BBR] (describing how a paperboy bought
stock on a tip regarding the bonanza).
241. Corporate Director’s Guidebook, supra note 108, at 1500.
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stronger if directors were themselves suspected of opportunistic
trading.
Those who worry that executives will behave badly if tempted to
trade (or support someone else’s trading) should worry about insider
giving as well. Insider trading enriches insiders when the business
prospers and protects them when it falters. This provides a perverse
incentive to increase volatility, but at least there is some upside for
shareholders in the good times: the insider gains strong incentives to
increase the corporation’s value. Although most scholars regard
insider trading as providing bad incentives on balance, some prominent
contrarians fixate on the energy with which insiders may pursue good
outcomes that they can trade on.242
Insider giving provides similar, but arguably worse, incentives
because it does little to encourage good outcomes. The insider can
discreetly dispose of stock by gift when problems arise, but there is no
way to get rich from a great increase in value. Insider giving therefore
functions like a put option.243 If things work out badly, the executive
claims a large deduction rather than going down with the ship. Thus,
the insider becomes indifferent to terrible outcomes without becoming
especially interested in good outcomes. This encourages a strategy of
picking up pennies in front of a steam roller. This is not a good
incentive.
Indeed, the special worry that insiders may manipulate disclosures
to facilitate more advantageous transactions seems especially
worrisome for insider giving. Precisely when it is most important for a
corporation to be forthright, insider giving provides a reason for
management to hold back the truth. Yet, the longer information is
withheld, the harder it is for a troubled business to course correct.
Recall that a hypothetical delay in JetBlue’s disclosures could help
large shareholders maximize their gifts, but it also would increase the
number of ticket sales that would need to be renegotiated with
customers.244

242. See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 233, at 55.
243. Anne Sraders, What Is a Put Option? Examples and How To Trade Them in 2019,
THESTREET (Jan. 9, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://www.thestreet.com/investing/options/what-is-a-putoption-14826777 [https://perma.cc/2F5W-WM2M] (“A put option is a contract that allows an
investor the right but not the obligation to sell shares of an underlying security at a certain price
at a certain time.”). A put option pays nothing when stock prices rise and a positive amount when
stock prices fall sufficiently. Id. It protects an investor against declines in value.
244. Supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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Nor is the disclosure problem always in favor of insufficient
disclosure. Insiders who plan to dispose of stock, whether by gift or
sale, prefer early disclosures of positive corporate information. This
Article demonstrates how a large shareholder would have enjoyed
greater tax benefits if JetBlue disclosed information earlier. But early
disclosure might benefit competitors. Executives have a duty to time
disclosures in the best interests of the company, subject to federal
securities mandates. Insider giving, like insider trading, gives them a
reason to push for other times—even if it harms the corporation and
most of its investors.
2. Harms to Market Quality. Trading markets make at least two
important contributions.245 First, liquidity means the ability to quickly
and cheaply sell or buy an asset. If trading markets are liquid, investors
can save for retirement and obtain appropriate diversification. Risky
young businesses will also find it easier to raise capital if their early
investors know that it will later be easy to liquidate their investment.
Second, price accuracy means that the publicly observed trading prices
of assets bear a strong relationship to their real value,246 rather than
arising from manipulation and bubbles. Accurate prices let observers
make better decisions, such as how to invest or redeploy resources in
the economy.247 Much of insider trading law is focused on improving
price accuracy without unduly harming liquidity.
Insider trading bears a complex relationship with price accuracy.
On the one hand, traders who know material nonpublic information
can improve the accuracy of asset prices by expressing their informed
views through trading,248 and the possibility of trading profits

245. Fox et al., supra note 23, at 833 (“How well the market functions can be described largely
in terms of its two most important characteristics: price accuracy and liquidity.”).
246. Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung & Artyom Durnev, Law, Share Price
Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331, 342–44 (2003);
see also Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 41 DUKE
L.J. 977, 979 (1992) (“The compliance effort is rationalized, to a significant degree, by one
principal goal of securities laws: to create stock markets in which the market price of a stock
corresponds to its fundamental value.”).
247. Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence:
An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1015 (1984); Kahan, supra note 246, at 1005–16.
248. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L.
REV. 549, 629–34 (1984).
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encourages them to acquire information.249 If insider trading were
widespread, executives would trade, expressing their knowledge of the
company; directors would tip corporate secrets to family and friends,
who then express their knowledge through trading; and confidences
would be forever violated, as spouses,250 psychiatrists,251 and Alcoholics
Anonymous partners252 rush to launder their confidantes’ secrets. It
might not be pretty, but it is hard to imagine a price bubble in such a
climate.
On the other hand, price accuracy is also endangered by insider
trading. Executives may push to reduce the quality of public
disclosures253 to multiply the opportunities for the insider to trade
ahead of unexpected news.254 Some scholars argue that insider trading
cannibalizes other forms of informed trading sufficiently that insider
trading reduces price accuracy.255 Most of all, many forms of
information are disclosed to the public as a result of federal securities
laws—any gains from insider trading may only be small improvements
in the speed of dissemination.
Although there is debate about whether insider trading helps or
hurts price accuracy overall, there is little doubt that it harms liquidity.
Extensive informed trading can demoralize investors from entering a
market at all.256 It can also raise the expected cost of trading. In many
markets, rising trading costs are reflected in wider “bid-ask spreads,”

249. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55
DUKE L.J. 711, 714 (2006).
250. See SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2003).
251. See United States v. Willis, 737 F. Supp. 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
252. See United States v. McGee, 955 F. Supp. 2d 466 (E.D. Pa. 2013), aff’d, 763 F.3d 304 (3d
Cir. 2014).
253. See supra note 233.
254. See supra note 232.
255. Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 249, at 711; see also Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider
Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical
Law and Economics Debate, 32 J. CORP. L. 237, 276 (2007) (showing that stock prices are
“presumably more informative” in countries with insider trading restrictions); Michael J. Fishman
& Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency of Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. ECON.
106, 110 (1992) (“[S]ome market professionals are deterred by insider trading. If a sufficient
number are deterred, the share price is less efficient.”).
256. This is one of the motivating ideas behind some insider trading-related legislation. H.R.
REP. NO. 100-910, at 7–8 (1988), as reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6043, 6044 (“[T]he small
investor will be—and has been—reluctant to invest in the market if he feels it is rigged against
him.”); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (“[I]nvestors likely would hesitate to
venture their capital in a market where [insider trading] is unchecked by law.”).
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which are the implied commissions charged by market intermediaries
called market makers.257 Market makers set those spreads in part based
on their costs.258 Their costs include expected trading losses.259 Every
time the market maker buys stock that goes down in price, the market
maker loses money. The odds of making a loss are to some degree
matched by the lucky gains where the market maker buys just before
the price rises. But when many traders are informed, the odds are
unbalanced. More often than not, market makers will be buying from
insiders who know the stock will soon fall and who would not be selling
if it were due to rise. Extensive theoretical and empirical evidence
supports the idea that traders with inside information—those very
traders whose trades may improve price efficiency—drive up the cost
of trading for everyone else.260
Insider giving tends to harm the stock market in exactly the way
that insider trading does. When stock is gifted, it does not reside with
the recipient forever. A best practice for foundations is to promptly
liquidate the gift to avoid expected trading losses,261 diversify their
portfolio,262 and obtain the cash they need for their mission. Many of
these sales will be prior to the bad news about the company becoming
public. To the degree charities are bearers of bad stock, market makers
will suffer expected losses in their dealings with them. The adverse

257. Nabil Khoury, Stylianos Perrakis & Marko Savor, PIP Transactions, Price Improvement,
Informed Trades and Order Execution Quality, 16 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 211, 226 (2010) (finding that
Boston Options Exchange market makers adopted positions matching those of informed traders);
Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical Evaluation of Adverse
Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 116 & nn.159–62 (2004).
258. See Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71, 72 (1985).
259. Id. at 84.
260. See Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 258, at 72–77; Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions
and Insider Trading, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1315, 1332 (1985); see also George A. Akerlof, The
Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 488
(1970) (discussing the liquidity of durable goods); Walter Bagehot, The Only Game in Town, 27
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 12, 13–14 (1971) (discussing the role of market makers in providing liquidity);
Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property
Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1251 (2001) (“It is widely agreed that insider trading
diminishes liquidity. This view is based on a theoretical model that suggests that market makers
will offset the risk of trading against insiders by increasing the bid-ask spread.”); Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of the Realm in the
Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 467, 469–70 (2001) (discussing the mixed evidence on
how insider trading affects liquidity).
261. Salotti & Power, supra note 145, at 7 n.2.
262. Moore & Higgins, supra note 143, at 161.
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selection model does not require the charity to know that it is passing
off troubled securities any more than the recipient of counterfeit
money must know they are spending fakes. The injury is done in that
the price-setting market intermediaries end up with assets they regret
buying. Because charities tend to promptly resell the stock they get,
insider giving has essentially the same market-injuring consequences
as insider selling.
3. Protecting Individual Traders. The most intuitive rationale for
insider trading laws is the injury or unfairness to individual investors
who trade in a pool of sharks. The individual who sells to an insider
before the price rises misses out, just as one who buys from an insider
before the stock drops will regret the purchase.263 The counterparty’s
loss in dealings with the insider may have the flavor of unfairness,264
fiduciary abuse,265 or theft.266 Similar unfairness arises when a charity
receives a gift under the same circumstances and sells it to an
unsuspecting investor. The uninformed buyer will regret buying. They
will rue the day they crossed paths (albeit anonymously) with a charity
that knew or should have known the importance of selling
immediately. As a current or future shareholder of the traded
company, the buyer would be right to think that they have been
mistreated by the executives who facilitated the insider gift; corporate
information is not swag for the CEO to dole out to especially favored
shareholders. Insofar as manipulative giving begins with executives
misusing the information with which they were entrusted, the
corporation’s residual claimants may not care if the misuse was by
trading or by helping others to trade.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Widespread manipulative giving is problematic and surprising.
This Part considers the policy implications for reform and the

263. William K. S. Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading: Victims, Violators and RemediesIncluding an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used Car with a Generic Defect, 45 VILL. L. REV.
27, 31–35 (2007).
264. Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 375, 376–77, 381 (1999); Levmore, supra note 232, at 119, 124, 125.
265. See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94
IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1339 (2009).
266. Jonathan R. Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 30 (1984); Richard J. Morgan, Insider Trading and the
Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 79, 94 (1987).
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conceptual implications for what insider gifts teach us about corporate
law and securities markets. The first Section considers reform
strategies that can preserve a culture of philanthropy without straining
the U.S. tax or trading system. It recommends removing tax rules that
bias donors in favor of stock rather than cash and securities rules that
exempt gifts from protective restrictions and disclosure. Then, Section
B notes what must be true about the world for insider giving to be
common: large shareholders must be more powerful and connected
than previously assumed. This partially undermines any dichotomy
between controlling shareholders and the rest. In fact, there appears to
be a continuous spectrum of influence from the largest shareholders on
down.
A. Reform
This Section considers reforms that could reduce the incidence
and injury of manipulative gifts. Some solutions are commonsense and
deserve immediate consideration. Others are plausible but force hard
choices.
1. Equating Gifts and Sales. Although insider gifts are subject to
numerous legal restrictions, several areas of securities law nevertheless
at least plausibly exempt gifts from requirements applicable to sales.
The reason is partially about policy, with the SEC believing that gifts
“present less likelihood for opportunities for abuse.”267 It is also drawn
from the platonic ideal of what a gift is: “a gift to charity or indeed to
anyone else when made in good faith and without pretense or
subterfuge [cannot] be considered a sale or anything in the nature of a
sale. It is the very antithesis of a sale . . . .”268 However, if gifts are timed
using insider information or backdating, there is a benefit to the
insiders, which undermines the basis for their exemption. This Article’s
findings challenge the raison d’etre of the regulatory exemptions for

267. Ownership Reports on Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Stockholders, supra
note 21.
268. Truncale v. Blumberg, 80 F. Supp. 387, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); see also Shaw v. Dreyfus,
172 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1949) (noting that bona fide gifts cannot be considered sales); Lewis v.
Adler, 331 F. Supp. 1258, 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (differentiating between the sale of stock options
and gift of stocks to charities).
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gifts. In many cases, gifts should be subject to the same or similar
treatment as sales.269
The clearest example is in the delayed reporting permitted to gifts.
While sales must be reported on Form 4 within two days, gifts may be
reported many months later—by 45 days after the end of the issuer’s
fiscal year—on Form 5. Yet this Article showed that delayed reporting
is likely associated with backdating. Allowing gift givers to select across
a 13.5 month period for the most advantageous price is simply too great
a temptation for backdating. The SEC should promulgate guidance
that gifts are subject to the same reporting requirement as sales.270
Likewise, several securities prohibitions on insider trading ought
to be extended to cover both sales and gifts. While there is a reasonable
argument that 10b-5 and Regulation FD already prevent insider giving,
the law should be clear. In general, such a reform would be best
handled by an SEC rule, given the SEC’s ample statutory authority to
support such a change.271 However, in some instances it is possible for
individual courts to take the lead. It is courts, after all, that created the
implication that gifts might not be sales for these purposes.272
One might argue that prosecutions for insider giving would tend
to chill gifts of stock, thus harming charities, but the risk is low. Any
time it is lawful for executives to sell their stock, they could lawfully

269. Although this leveling up proposal urges equivalent treatment under the law, the same
would be true as further reforms are considered. For example, Josh Mitts argues that insiders
should be required to disgorge gains made from sale at ephemeral prices – a sort of extension of
16(b). Joshua Mitts, Insider Trading and Strategic Disclosure 17 (Colum. L. Sch. Ctr. for L. &
Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 636, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3741464 [https://perma.cc/
8BGQ-954W]. If enacted, similar considerations should bear on gifts at ephemeral prices.
270. If it is necessary to soften such an intervention, there are a number of options that would
still do a lot of good. For example, prompt reporting could be generally required except for small
gifts—an exemption for purchases less than $10,000 is already in place. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a–
6(a)(1) (2020). Small purchases can be part of an abusive scheme, but small purchases are less
problematic than large ones, as we have already documented that analogously large gifts are more
problematic than small ones. Alternatively, one could impose moderate reporting windows—say,
five days—for most gifts and reserve two-day reporting for the most suspicious gifts, such as those
to charities controlled by the donor.
271. Supra Part II.
272. See, e.g., Truncale, 80 F. Supp. at 391; see also Shaw, 172 F.2d at 142 (“Certainly bona
fide gifts, as these were conceded to be, are not within the accepted meaning of ‘sales’; nor do
they involve ‘any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of’ the property given.”); Lewis, 331 F.
Supp. at 1268 (“A reexamination of 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10, however, indicates that it incorporates
the provisions of 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-9 only ‘in so far as [the transaction] is otherwise subject to
the provisions of section 16(b),’ [Previous cases] have determined that a bona fide gift is not
subject to the provisions of § 16(b) of the Act.”).
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donate it. The 10b5-1(c) trading plans that allow for periodic sales of
stock could allow gifts as well. Moreover, many users of manipulative
giving strategies may still be inclined to give because of the altruistic,
reputational, and tax benefits. They will simply arrange their affairs
less aggressively to capture unwarranted tax benefits. It is even possible
that limiting manipulative gifts will increase giving. The prestige of
giving gifts depends on them not becoming associated with abusive
conduct; if newspapers continue to identify suspicious gifts, innocent
donors may seek to distance themselves from tarnished practices.273
Finally, any possible reduction of gifts due to reform, if deemed
problematic, could be offset by increased government support for
charities or subsidies for gifts. Recall that manipulative givers are
generally reducing their tax burden by a disproportionate amount.
Cutting down on unwarranted deductions saves the fisc money. If
desired, that money can be immediately redeployed with targeted
funding to charitable causes or increased tax credits for donors. There
is no reason that reform must lead to a net reduction in government
support for charitable causes. Reform only means that government
expenditures for supporting charities will no longer disproportionately
flow to those willing to commit fraud or abuse positions of trust.
2. Equating Cash and Stock. Outside of corporate and securities
law, much mischief could be avoided if the tax code simply did not
encourage gifts of stock to charities.274 A primary reason that stocks
serve as manipulative gifts is that there are legitimate nonmanipulative
reasons to give stock. Donors can avoid taxes on appreciation by giving
appreciated property, rather than selling it prior to the gift.
The tax code could be amended to eliminate this reason to give
property. The simplest way would be to treat a gift as a realization
event—then the donor would pay taxes on capital gains at the time of

273. Institutions often decline gifts from problematic donors in order to preserve reputational
capital. When they accept tarnished gifts, they apologize. Cf., e.g., Joi Ito, My Apology Regarding
Jeffrey Epstein, MIT MEDIA LAB (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.media.mit.edu/posts/my-apologyregarding-jeffrey-epstein [https://perma.cc/2BFK-FC53] (providing a prominent example of such
an apology). Presumably, one reason for this is to encourage other donors to continue to give.
274. In this view, we join with most tax scholars who disapprove of the distortions currently
favoring gifts of property. See, e.g., Gerzog, supra note 51, at 1159; Colinvaux, supra note 223, at
292; Knauer, supra note 226, at 91.
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the gift.275 There would no longer be an advantage to giving gifts of
stock rather than cash. Gifts of stock might sometimes still occur. But
with one important legitimate reason to give stock eliminated, such
gifts would be rarer and more suspicious. Government officials may be
able to more quickly and confidently investigate the timing of the gift
to determine whether manipulation may be in play.276
3. Mandatory (or Forbidden) Holding. One solution to the
problem of overvalued gifts is to require charities to immediately
liquidate any gifted securities. With this solution, there is certainty, for
example, that an executive who deducts $92 million for a gift of stock
really enriched the charity by $92 million. This would also expose and
eliminate fictitious pricing from backdating.
But a mandatory, prompt sale may raise other issues. A charity
that attempts to sell a large stake into an illiquid market may cause the
price to fall, depleting the contribution and creating the false
impression of a misdeed. There should be leeway to allow the charity
to sell the shares in an orderly fashion. More importantly, securities
law’s policy of supporting low trading costs and equal treatment of
investors is undermined if the donor and charity collectively deposit
toxic stock in the market.277
Since securities policy is harmed by prompt sale, perhaps the
opposite reform should be considered. Mandatory holding by the
charity would support securities policy, at the cost of tax policy: the
charity is likely to hold the stock during the decline in value, creating a
wedge between the tax deduction value and the realized value to the
recipient. It also forces the charity to operate without cash it may need
and to bear idiosyncratic risk (that is, that the stock might decline for
reasons having nothing to do with inside information). Finally, longer
holding periods exacerbate and further hide fictitious pricing arising
from backdating.
So, there is an unavoidable tradeoff between tax and securities
policy. Either choice may be appropriate if other reforms can minimize

275. Donors can also claim a large tax deduction at the time of the gift, even if the securities
are most profitably sold over a longer time horizon. This provides an independent reason to
donate property, but it is unlikely to be highly significant for gifts of liquid securities.
276. Another possibility is for Congress or the regulators to consider fixing the donations
period so that it is not a single moment in time and to require the stock valuation, for purposes of
the deduction, to be computed as the average trading price over a period of time. The details of
such a proposal exceed the scope of this Article.
277. Supra Part IV.B.2.
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the downsides associated with the choice. If prompt sale is
accompanied by vigorous detection and prosecution of gifts based on
material nonpublic information, then prompt sale can be safely
required. If mandatory holding is accompanied by timely reporting
requirements to combat backdating, mandatory holding may be
superior.
This Section has addressed how our empirical findings matter for
regulators and lawmakers. But discoveries about the world also matter
as discoveries. They change the way scholars think about the subject,
with whatever downstream effects that may have on research or
reform. The next and final Section turns to theoretical implications of
the widespread occurrence of insider giving.
B. Theory of the Shareholder
CEOs often grant one-on-one meetings with prominent investors,
particularly those who indicate displeasure with the company’s
apparent prospects. Should CEOs seek to calm those activist investors
with a peek at reassuring, but nonpublic, information? There is good
reason to think that they do. Indeed, they often contractually commit
to doing so: one recent study found that more than 29 percent of the
time shareholder engagement results in a contract,278 that contract
promises special information access.279 These are extensive information
rights far in excess of the information available to ordinary
shareholders. Likewise, venture capitalists demand such covenants
when they invest in early-stage companies.280
Even without explicit information sharing, investors can secure
implicit ongoing access to information if they place a director on the
board. When shareholder engagement leads to a corporation–
shareholder agreement, more than a third of such contracts promise a

278. Jordan Schoenfeld, Contracts Between Firms and Shareholders, 58 J. ACCT. RSCH. 383,
414 (2020). The author likewise finds that such contracts arise in 24 percent of shareholder
engagement. Id. at 385.
279. Id. at 410.
280. Gabriel Rauterberg, The Separation of Voting and Control: The Role of Contract in
Corporate Governance 22 (June 28, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3637204 [https://perma.cc/4QTV-7272] (reporting that 55 percent of new IPOs are
subject to a shareholder agreement or were subject to one just prior to the IPO); id. at 32
(reporting that information rights are common).
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board representative to the shareholder.281 And the venture capitalist
agreements that operate in the few years after an IPO almost always
award one or more director seats to identifiable investor
constituencies.282 As directors, these individuals have nearly unfettered
access to the corporation’s information.283 The avowed purpose of
placing these directors on the board is to supply the nominating
investor with ongoing and intimate knowledge of the business’s
prospects.284 These constituency nominees are often employees of the
nominating shareholder285 or receive other compensation from the
nominating shareholder.286 Many directors likewise recognize strong
obligations to a particular shareholder when they serve on the board of
a company with a controlling shareholder; at such a company, every
shareholder serves at the pleasure of the controlling shareholder.

281. Schoenfeld, supra note 278, at 410; accord Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on
Wall Street 2.0, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 213 n.191 (2012) (“Investors in venture capital–backed
companies sometimes receive board ‘observation rights,’ which give them the ability to sit in on
board meetings and thereby get information about the company’s direction. Observation rights
may exclude the observer from full participation in the board meeting, such as during the
executive sessions.”).
282. See Rauterberg, supra note 280, at 47 (reporting 85 percent of sampled shareholder
agreements explicitly or implicitly allocate directorates); accord Steven N. Kaplan & Per
Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture
Capital Contracts, 70 REV. ECON. STUD. 281, 287–90 (2003) (investigating a sample of 119
startups, finding venture capitalist investors get a seat on the board of directors in almost half of
startups and board control in about 25 percent).
283. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(d) (2020) (“Any director shall have the right to
examine the corporation’s . . . books and records for a purpose reasonably related to the director’s
position as a director.”); Chammas v. NavLink, Inc., No. CV 11265-VCN, 2016 WL 767714, at *6
(Del. Ch. Feb. 1, 2016) (“A director who has a proper purpose, however, has ‘virtually unfettered’
rights to inspect books and records. Such ‘unfettered’ rights imply a right of access at least equal
to that of the remainder of the board. Management cannot ‘pick and choose’ the specific
information each director receives.” (quoting Norman v. US MobilComm, Inc., No. CIV.A. 849N, 2006 WL 1229115, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28, 2006))).
284. Jill E. Fisch & Simone M. Sepe, Shareholder Collaboration, 98 TEX. L. REV. 863, 873
(2020).
285. See generally, e.g., id. (examining the shareholder-collaboration that occurs when hedge
funds and venture capitalists place their employees on the target firm’s board); John C. Coffee,
Jr., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Joshua R. Mitts & Robert E. Bishop, Activist Directors and Agency
Costs: What Happens When an Activist Director Goes on the Board, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 381
(2019) (studying the information leakage that follows a hedge fund’s nomination of one of its
employees to a firm’s board).
286. Gregory H. Shill, The Golden Leash and the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, 64 UCLA L.
REV. 1246, 1268–71 (2017); Adam Prestidge, Activist Compensation of Board Nominees and the
Middle Ground Response, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 307, 309–10 (2015) (describing compensation
for activist nominees and undertaking policy analysis).
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Needless to say, when a director is placed on the board at the request
of an identifiable shareholder patron with a mandate to deliver
information, these shareholders may receive information not available
to others—there is suggestive evidence that this occurs.287
It is understandable why these investors would want access: with
a microscope on the corporation, they can make sure executives are
making value-creating decisions without extracting too many perks. By
coordinating with their on-board directors, expert shareholders can
add value as monitors.288 Others have argued that cash-strapped firms
may best obtain financing by providing superior terms to investors
willing to risk money on them, and that board seats and information
rights may be part of that bargain.289 It is also understandable why
corporate law might want to constrain unequal access: it can help the
well-informed shareholder at the expense of the corporation and its
other investors.290 Now that this Article has shown that investors likely
use their superior access to engage in manipulative transactions, those
arguments can be revisited with greater precision. The private benefits
associated with a controlling shareholder exist much further down the
corporate food chain than control—any investor powerful enough to
demand access can use that access to claim superior transaction results
in the form of gifts.
In light of the evidence about how investors utilize their access,
corporate law theory must revise its implicit assumptions about the
private benefits of control: these benefits may result from a much lower
percentage of ownership than commonly expected. It tends to support
recent cases, like In re Tesla Motors,291 which held that a 22 percent

287. Coffee et al., supra note 285, at 408–28.
288. Kastiel & Nili, supra note 102, at 46–47 (“If a constituent director is unable to share
information with the fund that places her on the board, that director will not be able to utilize the
fund’s vast sources to process and analyze data received from the board or enhance the
monitoring of the management team.”).
289. Sepe, supra note 29, at 312, 315, 337–38; Martin Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Lift
Not the Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1069,
1105; cf. Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting Out of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: An
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1075, 1115 (2017)
(“One can further assume—plausibly, in the context of at least some early-stage companies—that
corporate opportunities are one of the most valuable forms of compensation a corporation has to
offer.”).
290. Gilson & Gordon, supra note 27, at 785.
291. In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. CV 12711-VCS, 2020 WL 553902 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 4, 2020).
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owner could warrant the skeptical treatment owed to a controlling
shareholder.292 If control includes the ability to extract and use inside
information, the percentage held in ownership may be a great deal
lower than that.
Likewise, a debate rages about the proper evaluation of activist
hedge funds. Are they forces of market discipline or opportunists (or
both)? A recent study shows that information leakage increases when
activists take a board seat.293 This Article supports the notion that
activists obtain benefits from their role that may not help shareholders
as a whole.
Insider giving also teaches that these benefits can express
themselves in subtle ways not ordinarily discussed in the literature.
Professors Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon identify three ways for
controllers to profit from control: transacting with the entity on
advantageous terms, selling control to someone else, or freezing out
the minority.294 Insider giving is plainly none of those.
To be sure, this Article is only talking about gifts. If gift-giving is
the only private benefit large shareholders extract, it may not inspire a
fundamental rethinking of shareholder power. Yet it is precisely
because these are only gifts that they have so much to teach. These gifts
occupy a liminal space, unlikely to result in detection and punishment,
but still arguably illegal and injurious. They provide a potent insight
into the behavior and power of shareholders. Thinking that they act
without observers or enforcers, large shareholders show what they are
capable of. They have enough access to extract market-moving
information and use it for transactions. Presumably, they use this
access in other ways that are not yet subject to detection and analysis.
Scholars interested in shareholder power must take note.
Finally, our empirical findings bring up a related finance question.
Does gifting by a large shareholder provide useful information to
ordinary investors regarding overpricing in the stock market? The
answer seems like a definite yes. Abnormal stock price declines should
be used by sophisticated investors in managing their portfolios.
Someone who knows when shareholders make gifts could outperform
the market by selling at the same time.
Nevertheless, there are important practical limits on this
investment strategy. The key is reporting delays. This is because gifts
292.
293.
294.

Id. at *4–5.
Coffee et al., supra note 285, at 408–28.
Gilson & Gordon, supra note 27, at 786.
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do not need to be reported right away, and most are reported with
substantial delays. In many cases, by the time gifts are reported, prices
have already declined. But a trader who learned promptly about
insider gifts could profitably outperform the market.
CONCLUSION
This Article investigates the information content of charitable
gifts by large shareholders using a comprehensive database that
contains over 9,000 observations between 1986 and 2020. These
findings apply generally to all large shareholders’ gifts of their firm’s
stock in all publicly listed firms in the United States.
We find that large shareholders’ charitable gifts are suspiciously
well timed. Stock prices rise abnormally about 6 percent during the
one-year period before the gift date and they fall abnormally by about
4 percent during the one-year period after the gift date. The evidence
suggests these results are neither due to luck nor skill in analyzing
information. To the contrary, this research indicates that large
shareholders’ success is likely due mostly to leakage of material
nonpublic information from the top executives and to a lesser extent
from the backdating of their gifts.
The prevalence of manipulative gifts is understandable. Relative
to lawful gifts, they deliver much more potent benefits. When trouble
looms for a company, manipulative gifts of its stock can deliver tax
benefits approximating or exceeding the profits from lawful sales. The
donor may be feted as an elite and enlightened benefactor, but the
gift’s true cost is paid by other taxpayers and whoever was unlucky
enough to buy the doomed shares from the charity. Gifts are also much
safer than outright insider trading. Prosecutors may be reluctant to
challenge manipulative gifts because some of the best tools for
combating insider trading may not apply to gifts, and there is no
functional reporting regime to promptly detect and scrutinize gifts.
Given the excellent combination of safety and profitability, it
should be unsurprising that gifts are widely utilized by large
shareholders. Indeed, scholars have long noted that controlling
shareholders, venture capitalists, and activist hedge funds expect access
to management. In retrospect, it is obvious that information flows will
be used opportunistically where the legal risk is low, as it currently is
for gifts.
Yet there is no such thing as a free lunch, and the gifts
shareholders give have a social cost. A society that opposes valuation
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abuse under the tax code or insider trading under securities laws should
be concerned by manipulative gifts. This Article advocates for
removing the free pass currently afforded to even the most suspicious
gifts and for continued inquiry into the topic.
Gifts by large shareholders also give a window into the concealed
role powerful investors play in corporations. Our findings indicate that
large investors have and exercise a much wider degree of access than
commonly understood. This fact should operate as a premise in any
subsequent empirical and theoretical projects examining shareholder
behavior and power, including those that do not focus on gifts. It
rehearses an insight developed by anthropologists,295 sociologists,296
and philosophers about the nature of gifts.297 Gifts may appear to be
disinterested and radically separate from the logic of exchange. Yet
gifts substitute for other transactions, and giving is continuous with
other forms of commerce and economic life.

295. E.g., C.A. Gregory, Gifts, in THE NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 524,
524 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) (“Anthro-pologists stress that while gifts appear to be
voluntary, disinterested and spontaneous, they are in fact obligatory and interested.”).
296. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491,
496–99 (2005); MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN
ARCHAIC SOCIETIES 3 (W. D. Halls. trans., W. W. Norton 1990) (1950) (“In Scandinavian
civilization, and in a good number of others, exchanges and contracts take place in the form of
presents . . . .”).
297. See generally Jeanne L. Schroeder, Pandora’s Amphora: The Ambiguity of Gifts, 46
UCLA L. REV. 815 (1999) (analyzing political philosophy of gifts to conclude gifts are used by
the donors to impose obligations on donees).

